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INTRODUCTION

This article examines several doctrines of American maritime law relating to the personal injury of longshoremen and
harbor workers. At present this area is governed by overlapping provisions of maritime negligence law, similar in many
respects to the common law of negligence, and by the statutes
comprising the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,1 as amended. The integration of these two
mechanisms of loss allocation has presented a considerable dilemma for the courts. It has been stated that courts "cannot
write on a fresh slate" 2 in fashioning new doctrines in the
maritime area. Thus, the history of the various contributing
principles is critical to an attempt to understand the present
status of the law as it relates to injured longshoremen and
harbor workers, and to evaluate suggested principles for the
future.
II.

HISTORY

A. In General
It is very likely that ever since man first took to the sea in
ships he has had a code, at first oral, later written: a network
of rules and customs known, observed and enforced by all who
plied the sea.3 As on land, damage, injury and death occur on
the sea. The necessities of the sea and seafaring demanded
rules and customs. It would be a mistake, however, to view the
web of rules and codes which grew out of seafaring life and
activities as a system of arcane and enigmatic customs, usages
and practices intelligible only to a select few. "The maritime
law is not a corpus juris - it is a very limited body of customs and ordinances of the sea." 4 It is much like the common
law - a system based on pragmatism, albeit with some historical quirks. There "is nothing really forbiddingly esoteric
1. 44 Stat. 1424 (1927); Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1263 (1972) (codified at 33
U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976)) [hereinafter cited as LHWCA].
2. G. GIMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADumERATY 411 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter

cited as GLMoRE & BLACK].
3. Some authorities have pointed to the maritime code promulgated by the Island
of Rhodes in 900 B.C. as the earliest of which any mention is made in the ancient
literature. See GiLMORE & BLACK, supra note 2, at 3-4.
4. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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about... [the maritime] law. It is just law, in a special factual setting."5
Since it is concerned with persons and property of an itinerant nature, the maritime law developed in an international
setting. Early in American admiralty legal history, Justice
Story observed these origins:
[The] maritime jurisdiction, which commercial convenience,
public policy, and national rights, have contributed to establish, with slight local differences, over all of Europe; that jurisdiction, which, under the name of consular courts, first established itself upon the shores of the Mediterranean, and,
from the general equity and simplicity of its proceedings,
soon commended itself to all the maritime states .... Of
this great system of maritime law it may be truly said,...
["Nor will there be one law at Rome, another at Athens, one
now, another in the future; instead, one law eternal and immutable will govern all nations for all times."] 6
As the writers of a well known treatise have stated, "Certainly
the early opinions (especially those of Story) prove that the
courts looked on the maritime system they were administering
as international in scope, for they are replete with citations to
the continental European authorities, not for persuasive analogy but 'as evidence of the general marine law.' -7
The maritime law, however, affects not only sailors,
merchants, traders, shipowners and stevedores, but also those
who live and move under the jurisdiction of the "shoreside" or
common law. Consequently, it is not surprising that the common law has had an influence, to a varying extent, on the
growth and development of the maritime law in England and
the United States. However, the maritime law was bound
neither by the developed principles of the common law nor by
the deep land-based historical roots of that system. It could
sift and winnow the rules of the common law, adopting what
seemed useful and good and rejecting what seemed harsh or
inexpedient. For instance, maritime law enforces contracts, in5. GmmoRo & BLACK, supra note 2, at 46.
6. De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 443 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (quoting CicERo, THE
REPUBLmc, H, xxii, 33 ["Nec erit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac; sed et omnes gentes et omni tempore, una lex, et sempiterna et immutabilis
continebit."]).
7. GLMORE & BLACK, supra note 2, at 46.
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cluding "charter parties, affreightments, marine hypothecations, contracts for maritime service in the building, repairing,
supplying, and navigating ships; contracts between part owners of ships; contracts and quasi contracts respecting averages,
contributions and jettisons; and, . . . policies of insurance,"8
but "it is an established rule of ancient respectability that
oral contracts are generally regarded as valid by maritime
law."" The maritime law never accepted the common-law
terms of the statute of frauds.10
B. Seamen
To understand the development of the maritime law in relation to injured longshoremen and harbor workers, one must
trace the history of that law as it involved injured seamen.1"
For the captain and crew on the high seas, the vessel constitutes a closed system. No one can leave at his will in the manner that a disgruntled clerk can leave a shop; all are subject to
restriction of movement. This fact has led to the creation of
three principal remedies for seamen injured onboard the
vessel.
The first remedy is that of maintenance and cure.12 The
Supreme Court in 1903 in The Osceola's formulated the rule
of maintenance and cure: "[T]he vessel and her owners are
liable, in case a seaman falls sick, or is wounded, in the service
of the ship, to the extent of his maintenance and cure, and to
his wages, at least so long as the voyage is continued."1 4 As
the remedy has been carried forward in the federal courts, it
is said to be "designed to provide a seaman with food and
lodging when he becomes sick or injured in the ship's service,
8.De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 444 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
9. Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 734 & n.4 (1966) (emphasis added).
10. See, e.g., Union Fish Co. v. Erickson, 248 U.S. 308 (1919); Gardner v. The
Calvert, 253 F.2d 395 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 960 (1958); Orient MidEast Great Lakes Serv. v. Int'l Export Lines, Ltd., 207 F. Supp. 127 (D. Md. 1962).
11. For a more comprehensive exposition of the prior law in this area, see generally Stover, Longshoreman-Owner-Stevedore: The Circle of Liability, 61 MICH. L.
REv. 539 (1963); Stover, PracticalPersonal Injury Phases of Maritime Law, 45

MARQ. L. REv. 59 (1961).
12. "Maintenance" is another term for a living allowance to the individual seaman. See Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525 (1938). "Cure" means medical

expenses. Id.
13. 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
14. Id. at 175.
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and extends during the period when he is incapacitated to do
a seaman's work and continues until he reaches maximum
medical recovery.

' 15

The vessel owner's duty is liberally inter-

preted in favor of the seaman, 16 and the duty is imposed without regard to negligence or fault on the part of the seaman.17
The right to maintenance and cure is forfeited only by clearly
wrongful conduct, such as insubordination, disobedience of orders and gross misconduct. 18 The vessel owner's obligation is
an affirmative duty which arises out of the employment contract between the vessel and the seaman, 9 or as it is sometimes put, out of the relationship or status between the vessel
and the seaman.2 Maintenance and cure is not intended to
compensate the injured seaman for disabilities suffered and
therefore does not provide him with damages either for pain
and suffering, or for loss of future earning capacity.
A compensatory damage remedy for seamen slowly
emerged from the vessel owner's duty to furnish a seaworthy
vessel. The duty, first recognized in relation to seamen by the
federal courts in 1789,21 was enforced under a contract theory.22 Initially, this remedy did not enable an injured seaman
to recover damages for a breach, but allowed him merely to
make reasonable complaints about the condition of the vessel.
It also allowed him the privilege to leave the service of the
vessel without incurring charges of mutiny or desertion and
15. Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 531 (1962).
16. See, e.g., id. at 532; Dragich v. Strika, 309 F.2d 161, 163 (9th Cir. 1963).
17. See, e.g., Oswalt v. Williamson Towing Co., 488 F.2d 51, 53 (5th Cir. 1974);
Prendis v. Central Gulf S.S. Co., 330 F.2d 893, 896 (4th Cir. 1963).
18. See, e.g., Mullen v. Fitz Simons & Connell Dredge & Dock Co., 199 F.2d 557
(7th Cir. 1952); Blovin v; Amer. Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 1150,
1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Bencic v. Marine Traders, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 561, 565 (D. Del.
1966).
19. See, e.g., Boggs v. Dravo Corp., 532 F.2d 897, 901 (3d Cir. 1976); Turner v.
Wilson Line of Mass., 242 F.2d 414, 417 (1st Cir. 1957); Doucette v. Vincent, 194 F.2d
834, 838 (1st Cir. 1952).
. 20. See, e.g., Sobosle v. United States Steel Corp., 359 F.2d 7, 11 (3d Cir. 1966);
Isthmian Lines, Inc. v. Haire, 334 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1964); Hudspeth v. AtL &
Gulf Stevedores, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 937, 939 (E.D. La. 1967); The Edward Pierce, 28
F. Supp. 637, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
21. Dixon v. The Cyrus, 7 F. Cas. 755 (D. Pa. 1789).
22. Id.; The Moslem, 17 F. Cas. 894 (S.D.N.Y. 1846); Rice v. The Polly and Kitty,
20 F. Cas. 666 (D. Pa. 1789). See also United States v. Ashton, 24 F. Cas. 873 (Cir. D.
Mass. 1834) (defense of unseaworthiness pleaded against charge of revolt).
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without forfeiting his wages.2 3 The contractual basis of the
duty eroded during the latter part of the nineteenth century
as seamen were awarded tort recoveries against the vessel for
injuries caused by hazardous and defective conditions existing
in breach of the seaworthiness obligation.2 4
As the tort aspect of the duty evolved, the federal courts
developed rules to provide that any contributory negligence or
assumption of risk by the seaman served only to diminish the
damage award, and not to provide an absolute bar to recovery. " As the Supreme Court stated in The Osceola: "[T]he
vessel and her owner are . . . liable to an indemnity for injuries received by seamen in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship, or a failure to supply and keep in order the
proper appliances appurtenant to the ship. "28
Liability for unseaworthiness to an injured seaman arose
only where the vessel owner's failure to exercise reasonable
care under the circumstances caused the injury. No liability
existed for unseaworthiness which resulted from latent defects
or those inherent structural defects not remediable through
the exercise of reasonable care. As to "appliances appurtenant
to the ship," liability was limited to those instances where the
owner had neglected to use reasonable care to "supply and
keep in order" proper appliances. Liability was restricted to
actual defects in the vessel and its equipment. Any negligence
on the part of the captain or crew in the operationof the vessel's equipment which resulted in injury to a seaman did not
constitute unseaworthiness so as to provide a means of recovery for damages. 28 "Operating negligence" was not included in
the unseaworthiness concept until 1944.29
23. Id.
24. See The Anaces, 93 F. 240 (4th Cir. 1899); see also cases cited in note 22
supra.
25. Hansen v. The Julia Fowler, 49 F. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1892). See also The Max
Morris, 137 U.S. 1 (1890); The Explorer, 20 F. 135 (C.C.E.D. La. 1884); The
Wanderer, 20 F. 140, 143 (C.C.E.D. La. 1884).
26. 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903).
27. The France, 59 F. 479 (2d Cir. 1894); The Henry B. Fiske, 141 F. 188 (D.
Mass. 1905); The Robert C. McQuillen, 91 F. 685 (D. Conn. 1899); The Concord, 58 F.
913 (S.D.N.Y. 1893); The Lizzie Frank, 31 F. 477 (S.D. Ala. 1887); The Edith Godden,
23 F. 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1885); The City of Alexandria, 17 F. 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1883).
28. See, e.g., Storgard v. France & Canada S.S. Co., 263 F. 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1920);
The Colusa, 248 F. 21, 24 (9th Cir. 1918).
29. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944). This concept was somewhat
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In 1922, the Supreme Court in Carlisle Packing Co. v.
3 0 a case which Justice Stewart forty-nine years
Sandanger,
later called "obscure," 3 1 made a statement in dictum which
was to be subsequently interpreted to mean that liability for
unseaworthiness did not depend on the exercise of reasonable

care but was strict and absolute in nature.3 2 The Court remarked, "[W]e think the trial court might have told the jury
that without regard to negligence the vessel was unseaworthy
when she left the dock if the can marked 'coal oil' contained
gasoline."3 3 This constituted a traditional case of the breach
of the duty of seaworthiness to supply and keep in order
proper appliances. The dictum lay dormant for several years
but was later applied as a rule of law in cases such as Sabine
Towing Co. v. Brennan," and The H.A. Scandrett, 5 where

the Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Augustus Hand,
cited Sandanger for the proposition that "liability for any injuries arising out of the neglect to supply a seaworthy vessel is
not dependent on the exercise of reasonable care but is

absolute."3 "
In 1944," in Mahnich v. Southern Steamship Co.,3s the
modified in Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494 (1971).
30. Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255 (1922).
31. Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 497 (1971). Earlier, Judge
Wisdom had said of Sandanger,it "gave a glimmering of things to come." Clevenger
v. Star Fish & Oyster, 325 F.2d 397, 399 (5th Cir. 1963).
32. 259 U.S. at 259.
33. Id.
34. 72 F.2d 490, 494 (5th Cir. 1934).
35. 87 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1937).
36. Id. at 710. Judge Hand offered a rationale for the rule:
Nor does this seem an unduly harsh imposition. A ship is an instrumentality
full of internal hazards aggravated, if not created, by the uses to which she is
put. It seems to us that everything is to be said for holding her absolutely
liable to her crew for injuries arising from defects in her hull and equipment.
The liability can be covered by insurance and is better treated as an expense of
business than one left to an uncertain determination of courts in actions to
recover for negligence.
Id. at 711.
37. Not all the federal courts had read Sandanger as imposing an absolute duty of
seaworthiness on the owner of the vessel irrespective of any consideration of reasonable care. Compare The Tawmie, 80 F.2d 792, 793 (5th Cir. 1936); The Cricket, 71
F.2d 61, 63 (9th Cir. 1934); Southern Ry. Co. v. Hermans, 44 F.2d 366, 369 (4th Cir.
1930); The Valdarno, 11 F.2d 35, 37 (5th Cir. 1926); Kahyis v. Arundel Corp., 3 F.
Supp. 492, 495 (D. Md. 1933); The Ipswich, 46 F.2d 136, 137 (D. Md. 1930) (reasonable care) with Roberts v. United Fisheries Vessels Co., 141 F.2d 288, 293 (1st Cir.
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Supreme Court, in holding that unseaworthiness encompassed
operating negligence, stated in broad terms that the vessel
owner's duty to furnish a seaworthy ship was absolute, and
not premised on negligence or fulfilled by the exercise of reasonable care.3 9 The seaworthiness doctrine requires that the
vessel owner furnish reasonably fit personnel as well as
reasonably fit supplies and equipment. 40 That the owner had
no prior knowledge of the unseaworthy conditions constitutes
no defense. 4 1 But the duty, while absolute, is not unattainable.
"The standard is not perfection, but reasonable fitness; ... a
vessel reasonably suited for her intended service."4
Maintenance and cure, and damages for unseaworthiness
do not provide the seaman with his only means of recovery for
injury. A cause of action for negligence is available as well.
This is separate and apart from negligence which may lead to
an unseaworthy condition on the vessel. As spelled out in The
Osceola,43 the general maritime law denied a seaman an action
to recover for personal injury based on a negligence theory
against the vessel or her owner. After a faulty attempt to
change the state of the law in 1915,44 Congress five years later
enacted the Jones Act 4 5 giving the seaman an action for negli-

1944); The See and Bee, 102 F.2d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 1939); The Alpha, 44 F. Supp.
809, 812 (E.D. Pa. 1942) (absolute duty).
38. 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
39. Id. at 100.
40. Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336, 339-40 (1955).
41. See, e.g., Thompson v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 331 F.2d 657, 659 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 913 (1964); Skipper v. Amerind Shipping Corp., 230 F. Supp. 253,
255 (E.D. La. 1904); Johnson v. Partrederiet Brovigtank, 202 F. Supp. 859, 862
(S.D.N.Y. 1962).
42. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960).
43. 180 U.S. 158 (1903).
44. Congress enacted the LaFollette Act of 1915, ch. 153, § 20, 38 Stat. 1164
(1915) which provided: "That in any suit to recover damages for any injury sustained
on board vessel or in its service seamen having command shall not be held to be
fellow-servants with those under their authority." Id. at 1185. The Supreme Court
nullified the intended effect of the statute by stating that it was not the fellow servant doctrine which barred recovery in negligence actions by a seaman against the
vessel, but the fourth proposition of The Osceola which did. 189 U.S. 158, 175
(1903)(no recovery for negligence of master or crew). Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S.
Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918). Thus, since Congress' action had no effect on the fourth
proposition, matters were left entirely as they had been.
45. Merchant Marine Act of 1920, ch. 250, § 20, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920) (Jones Act)
(codified at 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976)). The Jones Act works procedurally by incorporating by reference the terms of a portion of the Federal Employers' Liability Acts,
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gence against his shipowner-employer. The Jones Act incorporated FELA and abolished assumption of risk and contributory negligence as defenses, but provided that any damages
recoverable would be diminished in proportion to the amount
of negligence attributed to the seaman. 6 It proved a popular
means of recovery, but its importance lessened when the Supreme Court declared in Mahnich that the seaworthiness duty
was an absolute one and included operating negligence.
C.

Longshoremen and Harbor Workers

This article would hardly be necessary if the remedies afforded seamen had been deemed concurrently applicable
throughout their development to harbor workers (including
longshoremen), or, alternatively, if harbor workers had been
considered "landbased" seamen and for that reason had available the traditional remedies of seamen. However, such was
not the case. Maintenance and cure has never been afforded
harbor workers.'7 In actions for breach of the duty to furnish
a seaworthy vessel or for negligence, the development of the
law has been different and complex.
In suits by harbor workers against their employers for injuries caused by negligence, the first question to be answered
was whether the admiralty courts had cognizance of the action.46 There was an issue as to whether the duties and tasks
[hereinafter cited as FELA], 35 Stat. 65 (1908); 36 Stat. 291 (1910); 36 Stat. 1167
(1911); 53 Stat. 1404 (1930); 62 Stat. 989 (1948) (codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 851-60
(1976)), which abolished contributory negligence as a bar to recovery. Ch. 149, § 3, 35
Stat. 66 (1908) (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1976)).
46. Ch. 149, § 3, 35 Stat. 66 (1908) (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1976)).
47. See GLMORE & BLACK, supra note 2, at 282.
48. In 1860, the U.S. Supreme Court had stated that:
The jurisdiction of courts of admiralty, in matters of contract, depends upon
the nature and character of the contract; but in torts, it depends entirely on
locality. If the wrongs be committed on the high seas, or within the ebb and
flow of the tide, it has never been disputed that they come within the jurisdiction of that court.
Philadelphia, W & B R.R. v. Philadelphia & Havre de Grace Steam Towboat Co., 64
U.S. (23 How.) 209, 215 (1860). See also Thomas v. Lane, 23 F. Cas. 957, 960 (Cir. D.
Me. 1813) (Story, J.). Havre de Grace, however, involved a suit by a towboat company against a railroad which had left a sight pile against which one of the appellee's
towboats crashed. The case did not decide the question whether a harbor worker
could sue in admiralty for injuries sustained by reason of the vessel owner's negligence. In a later case, Judge Benedict relied on the Court's language in holding a
vessel liable in an admiralty proceeding for injury sustained by a harbor worker while
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performed by harbor workers were sufficiently maritime in nature to confer jurisdiction on the admiralty courts. 49 Before
the question was resolved,5 0 harbor workers brought their actions against employers in state courts and on the law side of
the federal courts, both of which imposed a duty of reasonable
care on the employer to furnish a safe work place and allowed
the defense of assumption of risk. 1 The admiralty courts were
influenced by the common-law courts and adopted the same
duty and defenses established there.52 Following New York's5s
lead, states began to extend coverage of their workers' compensation plans to harbor workers injured aboard a docked
vessel; but in 1917, 54 the Supreme Court held the New York
he was trimming cargo in the vessel's hold. The judge held that the injury occurred
"upon navigable waters" and was therefore within the jurisdiction of admiralty. Garrity v. The Bark Kate Cann, 2 F. 241, 243 (E.D.N.Y. 1880), aff'd, 8 F. 719 (2d Cir.
1881).
49. The nature of a harbor worker's tasks was argued only in cases when a harbor
worker sought a lien against the vessel for services provided. See, e.g., The Amstel, 1
F. Cas. 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1831) (harbor worker's work not maritime in nature since he
works on land, or on a vessel at the wharf; and his concern is with the cargo rather
than the ship); The Circassian, 5 F. Cas. 702 (E.D.N.Y. 1868); M'Dermott v. The S.
G. Owens, 16 F. Cas. 15 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849); The Joseph Cunard, 13 F. Cas. 1132
(S.D.N.Y. 1845). Contra, The Gilbert Knapp, 37 F. 209 (E.D. Wis. 1889); The George
T. Kemp, 10 F. Cas. 227, 229 (D. Mass. 1876). The emphasis in these maritime liens
cases was on the nature of the work done, rather than on the location where it was
performed. Early attempts by harbor workers to bring tort cases in admiralty were
impeded by the "nature of the work" analysis undertaken by the courts in cases dealing with attempts to create and enforce liens by harbor workers. Judge Benedict was
correct in looking to the "locality" where the tort was committed rather than to the
"nature of the work" done by the harbor worker in deciding whether admiralty jurisdiction attached. See note 48 supra.
One may wonder if the federal courts will now be forced full circle. Directed by
the terms of the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 902(3), to find included within its coverage a "longshoreman" and "other person[s] engaged in longshoring operations," the Court found that "the crucial factor is the nature of the
activity to which a worker may be assigned. Persons moving cargo directly from ship
to land transportation are engaged in maritime employment. [Our decision] ... focuses upon the nature, not the location, of employment." P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford,
100 S. Ct. 328, 337 (1979) (emphasis added).
50. Leathers v. Blessing, 105 U.S. 626 (1882) (citing no authorities) (business invitee sustained broken leg and ankle when carelessly stowed bales of cotton fell on

him).
51. See Tetreault, Seamen, Seaworthiness, and the Rights of Harbor Workers, 39
CORNELL L.Q. 381, 403 (1954).
52. See, e.g., Cornec v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 48 F.2d 497 (4th Cir. 1931) (no assumption of risk found); The Elton, 142 F. 367 (3d Cir. 1906) (fellow servant rule).
53. See 1913 N.Y. Laws ch. 816; 1914 N.Y. Laws chs. 41, 316.
54. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
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Compensation Act to be unconstitutional as applied to harbor
workers since actions to recover for shipboard injuries fell
within the federal admiralty jurisdiction. The Court maintained that to apply the state act would be contrary to a policy of national uniformity of maritime law and that the power
to modify maritime law was vested exclusively in the Congress.5 Later in 1917, Congress amended the "saving to suitors" ' clause to include claimants' rights and remedies under
state workers' compensation laws; 57 but three years later, that
amendment was held unconstitutional as an invalid delegation
of power to the state."' In 1924 a second amendment was
rebuffed by the Court.5 9
The Court itself then tried to remedy the problem. In 1926
in International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty,60 it held that
harbor workers were seamen under the Jones Act which gave
them a cause of action against their stevedore-employers for
negligence unimpeded by the assumption of risk doctrine. At
the time of the Haverty decision Congress was well along in
the process of drafting legislation to provide a federal maritime workers' compensation plan and, despite the remedy afforded by the Court's interpretation of the Jones Act, decided
to enact the bill,6 1 thereby nullifying the effect of Haverty six
months after it was handed down. The enacted plan was
called the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensa62
tion Act.
In many instances a harbor worker's injuries will result
from the negligence of the vessel's crew or from a defect in the

55. Id. at 214-16. But see Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 100 S. Ct. 2432 (1980).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1976).
57. Ch. 97, §§ 1 & 2, 40 Stat. 395 (1917).
58. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
59. Ch. 216, §§ 1 & 2, 42 Stat. 634 (1922) (held unconstitutional in Washington v.
W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924)).
60. International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926).
61. See 44 Stat. 1424, ch. 510, §§ 1-5 (1927) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50
(1932)). See Hearings on S. 3170 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary on S. 3170, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926); Hearings on H.R. 9498 Before a
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926); Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 3170, 69th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1926); H.R. REP. No. 1190, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. (1927); S. REP. No.
973, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. (1926); 67 CONG. REC. 10608-14 (1926); 68 CONG. REc. 540214 (1927), cited in Note, 75 YALE L.J. 1174, 1184 n.49 (1966).
62. LHWCA, supra note 1.
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vessel itself. In such cases the harbor worker may desire to
seek a third-party recovery against the vessel. The jurisdiction
of admiralty courts over such suits was affirmed in 1882.3 A
line of decisions followed in which harbor workers recovered
from the owners of vessels for injuries caused by physical defects in the vessel and its equipment.6 4 Such actions were premised on the vessel owner's alleged failure to provide a safe
place to work. Difficulties were encountered in this area, however, because the harbor worker's stevedore-independent contractor-employer was under a like duty to provide the harbor
worker-employee with a safe place to work aboard the vessel.8
Delineation of the respective roles of the vessel owner's duty
to the "business invitee"-harbor worker and the stevedore-independent contractor's duty to furnish its employee with a
safe work environment proved troublesome for the courts.
Some courts considered which party was in the better position
to avoid or rectify the condition or operation causing the injury, or which had control of the relevant portion of the
vessel.66
These conflicts became academic in 194667 when the Supreme Court held that the shipowner's absolute duty to furnish a seaworthy vessel to seamen was equally applicable to
harbor workers aboard the vessel. The harbor worker thus became entitled to recover from the shipowner based on the
63. Leathers v. Blessing, 105 U.S. 626 (1882).
64. See, e.g., The Anaces, 93 F. 240 (4th Cir. 1899); The Elton, 83 F. 519 (4th Cir.
1897); Steel v. McNeil, 60 F. 105 (5th Cir. 1894); The Protos, 48 F. 919 (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1891); The Rheola, 19 F. 926 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1884); Keliher v. The Nebo, 40 F. 31
(S.D.N.Y. 1889); The Carolina, 30 F. 199 (E.D.N.Y. 1886); The Max Morris, 24 F. 860
(S.D.N.Y. 1885), aff'd, 28 F. 881 (2d Cir. 1886), aff'd, 137 U.S. 1 (1890); The Calista
Hawes, 14 F. 493 (E.D.N.Y. 1882); The Helios, 12 F. 732 (S.D.N.Y. 1882); Gerrity v.
The Bark Kate Cann, 2 F. 241 (E.D.N.Y. 1880).
65. See, e.g., Cornec v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 48 F.2d 497, 502 (4th Cir. 1931); The
Joseph B. Thomas, 86 F. 658, 660 (9th Cir. 1898); Sagadahoc S.S. Corp. v. Seaboard
Stevedoring Corp., 26 F.2d 295 (N.D. Cal. 1928); Imbrovek v. Hamburg-Amer. Steam
Packet Co., 190 F. 229, 239 (D. Md. 1911), afl'd, 193 F. 1019 (4th Cir. 1912), af'd, 234
U.S. 52 (1914); The Thomas Cranage, 189 F. 1003, 1004-05 (W.D.N.Y. 1911); The
Beechdene, 121 F. 593 (D. Md. 1899); Keliher v. The Nebo, 40 F. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1889);
The Max Morris, 24 F. 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1885), afl'd, 28 F. 881 (2d Cir. 1886), qf'd, 137
U.S. 1 (1890); The Helios, 12 F. 732 (S.D.N.Y. 1882) (stating duty of vessel).
66. Mollica v. Compania Sud-Americana De Vapores (Chilean Line), 202 F.2d 25
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 965 (1953); Lopez v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 201
F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1953); Lynch v. United States, 163 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1947).
67. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
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shipowner's absolute duty to provide a seaworthy vessel. In
addition, a harbor worker retained his cause of action for negligence against the vessel and his right to receive workers'
compensation from his employer under the 1927 LHWCA.
Clothed with these three rights, the harbor worker was at last
on a par with his seaman counterpart who had the maintenance and cure, Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness
remedies. In affirming that the shipowner's duty to provide a
seaworthy vessel was absolute and nondelegable, a "species of
liability without fault, 6 "neither limited by conceptions of
negligence nor contractual in character,"6 9 the Court stated
that the owner could not escape this duty by parceling out his
operations to independent contractors or their harbor workers, who in so undertaking the task are "doing a seaman's
work and incurring a seaman's hazards. 7 0 In effect, the shipowner became almost an insurer of the harbor worker while he
was engaged in stevedoring or other harbor work.7 1 Due diligence as to the health and safety of harbor workers was no
longer the touchstone for determining the vessel's liability.
Seaworthiness claims fell into two categories: one, where
the owner, having actual or constructive knowledge that a certain activity would occur, had the absolute duty of furnishing
equipment and a place aboard ship for its use so that the activity could be undertaken in reasonable safety; and the other,
where the equipment actually supplied for doing the work
proved incapable of performing its function in the manner for
which it was designed.7 2 It became firmly established that the
vessel's unseaworthiness might arise from any number of individual circumstances, including:7 3 defective gear, appurtenances in disrepair, unfit crew,"' improper manner of loading

68. Id. at 94.

69. Id.
70. Id. at 99.
71. This was so despite occasional passing comments by the courts to the contrary. See Scott v. Isbrandtsen Co., 327 F.2d 113, 124 (4th Cir. 1964); Clevenger v.
Star Fish & Oyster Co., 325 F.2d 397, 400 (5th Cir. 1963); Freitas v. Pacific-Atlantic
S.S. Co., 218 F.2d 562, 564 (9th Cir. 1955).
72. See, e.g., Mesle v. Kea S.S. Corp., 260 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 966 (1959).
73. Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 499 (1971); Martinez v.
Dixie Carriers, Inc., 529 F.2d 457, 467 (5th Cir. 1976).
74. Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955).
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cargo 5 and improper stowage of cargo.76 Nevertheless, mere
negligent use of seaworthy equipment did not, in and of itself,
make a vessel unseaworthy. Control of the work area was irrelevant to liability for unseaworthiness. 77 A vessel was unseaworthy even if the defective equipment had been brought
aboard by a stevedore-employer for its own use.78 Whether or
not equipment was so defective as to render a vessel unseaworthy was a question of fact for the jury. The scope of the
meaning of the term was carried to -extreme lengths. For example, in one case, the Supreme Court held that it was a jury
question as to whether a wrench which had enough play in its
jaw to permit it to slip on a nut was such a defective appliance as to render a vessel unseaworthy. 9 The mere fact that
an accident occurred did not, in and of itself, establish
unseaworthiness8 0
Negligent use of an otherwise seaworthy appliance, which
was thereby made unseaworthy at the very instant of injury,
raised no unseaworthiness issue, and the owner of the vessel
was not liable for such "transitory unseaworthiness." 81 In
1971, the Supreme Court lessened somewhat the shipowner's
burden for damages by holding that a stevedore-employer's
negligence would not be imputed to the vessel owner so as to
bring about a liability for unseaworthiness s2
Between 1946 and 1956, shipowners contended that they
should have a right of indemnification or contribution against
stevedore-employers whose negligence brought about, in
whole or in part, a breach of the owner's duty of seaworthiness. In 1952, in a case in which a jury had found an owner to

75. Marshall v. Ove Skou Rederi A/S, 378 F.2d 193, 196 & n.3 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 828 (1967).
76. Morales v. City of Galveston, 370 U.S. 165 (1962).
77. Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954), aff'g, 205 F.2d 478 (9th Cir.
1953).
78. Rogers v. United States Lines, 347 U.S. 984 (1954); Considine v. Black Diamond S.S. Co., 163 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mass. 1958).
79. Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 364 U.S. 325 (1960).
80. Jefferson v. Taiyo Katun K.K., 310 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 967 (1963); Nuzzo v. Rederi A/S Wallenco, 304 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1962); Richter
v. Mathiasen's Tanker Indus., Inc., 297 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1961); Mosley v. Cia Mar.
Adra, S.A., 314 F.2d 223 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 829 (1963); Puddu v. Royal
Netherlands S.S. Co., 303 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1962).
81. See Grilles v. United States, 232 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1956).
82. Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494 (1971).

1980]

LHWCA AND COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE

be twenty-five percent negligent and a stevedore-employer to
be seventy-five percent causally negligent for a harbor
worker's injury, the Court denied the owner indemnification
because of the prohibition against contribution between joint
tortfeasors.83 The Court noted that any change in this concept
borrowed from the common law was properly a matter for legislative modification.
The final judicial innovation introduced in this area before
Congress acted in 1972" was the Court's decision8 5 that an
implied "warranty of workmanlike service" existed between
the shipowner and the stevedore-independent contractor-employer under the jobbing contract between these parties.8 6
Failure to perform the contract reasonably and safely
breached the warranty. Consequently, the shipowner was entitled to full indemnification from the stevedore-employer as reimbursement for any damages recovered by a harbor worker
from the shipowner or his ship for unseaworthiness of the vessel. The Court held that a stevedore-employer had an obligation, which was the essence of his contract with the vessel, to
perform stevedoring operations in a proper, competent and
workmanlike manner with reasonable safety and to indemnify
the shipowner for damages resulting from the stevedore's improper performance.8 7 By this contractual fiction, the Court
succeeded in circumventing the existing bar of the maritime
rule against contribution between joint tortfeasors and effectively shifted the burden from an innocent owner of a vessel
to a negligent stevedore-employer whose liability had previously been thought limited by the exclusive liability provisions of the LHWCA. 8
The federal courts expanded the stevedore-employer's
warranty of workmanlike service in a virtually limitless manner. The stevedore-employer's contractual obligation to per83. See, e.g., Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282
(1952). See also Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106 (1974).
84. LHWCA Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1263, amending
33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1970). See 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976).
85. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
86. Id. at 133.
87. Id. at 132-35.
88. Prior to the 1972 amendments § 905 provided that the employer's liability for
workers' compensation "shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such
employer to the employee . . . ." 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1970).
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form in a competent and workmanlike manner applied not
only to the handling and stowing of cargo, but also to the use
of equipment incidental to such operations. 89 It became well
settled, however, that the stevedore-employer was not liable
to indemnify the shipowner for a harbor worker's injuries
when those injuries were caused by a hidden or latent defect
of which the stevedore had neither actual nor constructive
knowledge.9 0 However, defects which were in fact observed
could not be left unremedied by the stevedore-employer.9 1
The injuries had to be caused by the particular defect of
which the stevedore had knowledge, but no knowledge was
imputed if the injury occurred before the stevedore-employer
had an adequate opportunity to remedy the condition.9 2 The
stevedore-employer had no duty to make a detailed inspection
of the work area prior to commencing work on a vessel. A cursory examination was sufficient.9 3 As a general rule, negligent
acts on the part of the owner-indemnitee were not held to preclude recovery from the stevedore-indemnitor. The right to
full indemnification came to include not only the amount of
the insured harbor worker's recovery from the shipowner but
also the shipowner's costs and actual reasonable attorney's
fees incurred in defending against the injured harbor worker's
9
claim. '

89. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563
(1958).
90. See, e.g., Allison v. Cosmos S.S. Corp., 433 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1970); Shaw v.
Lauritzen, 428 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1970); Ignatyuk v. Tramp Chartering Corp., 250 F.2d
198 (2d Cir. 1957).
91. See, e.g., T.S. Smith & Son, Inc. v. Skibs A/S Hassel, 362 F.2d 745, 747 (5th
Cir. 1966); Smith v. Jugosalvenska Linijska Plovidea, 278 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1960).
The stevedore could, however, stop work, advise the shipowner, and then proceed
without potential liability if ordered to do so by the shipowner. See United States v.
Arrow Stevedoring Co., 175 F.2d 329 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 904 (1949);
Cassone v. Venezuelan Line, 1962 A.M.C. 1347 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Nordeutsher Lloyd,
Brennan v. Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co., 195 F. Supp. 680 (D. Ore. 1961); Hugev v.
Dampskisaktieselskabet Int'l, 170 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Cal. 1959), af'd, 274 F.2d 875
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 803 (1960).
92. See, e.g., Orlando v. Prudential S.S. Corp., 313 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1963).
93. See, e.g., Delaneuville v. Simonsen, 437 F.2d 597 (5th Cir. 1971); Cia Maritima
Del Nervion v. Flanagan Ship Corp., 308 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1962); Atlantic & Gulf
Stevedores, Inc. v. Skibs A/S Danmotor, 342 F. Supp. 837 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
94. See, e.g., Rederi A/B Dalen v. Maher, 303 F.2d 565 (4th Cir. 1962); DeGioia v.
United States Lines Co., 304 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1962); A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v. Commercial Stevedoring Co., 256 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1958); Holley v. Steamship
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The foregoing historical sketch is somewhat detailed, but
it is presented to illustrate the tangled and intricate web of
law which Congress faced in 1972 when it sought, at last, to
alter some of the judicial superstructure developed in the
maritime law over the prior ninety years and to impress that
law with simpler, more expedient, and fairer concepts for the
determination of liability for injuries sustained by a longshoreman or harbor worker in the course of his employment.
III. EXAMINATION
In the practice of statutory interpretation, resort is often
made to the legislative history of an enactment to divine the
legislative intent of those who passed the statute into law.
When a statute is ambiguous or vague, courts often turn for
guidance to the hearings, committee reports and debates of
the legislature. In the case of the 1972 amendments to the
LHWCA, the federal courts have treated these materials, especially the committee reports, as a "Rosetta stone" in deciphering the supposed intent and purpose of the Congress enacting them. Unfortunately, legislative intent is often a fiction
employed by courts to provide support for a particular statutory interpretation which they desire to achieve. Rarely, if
ever, can anything approaching an authentic and real legislative intent of the collective body enacting a law be identified.
The views and opinions of key sponsors of a piece of legislation can be pointed to, but what they utter in committee or on
the floor in debate is not always what they really think or intend. Many times, what they say is only what they perceive as
necessary to be said in order to gain a sufficient majority for
passage. Nevertheless, while resort to a fictional legislative intent is rarely, if ever, a reliable indicium of collective legislative purpose, such resort is made by many courts, including
the Supreme Court. The legislative history of the 1972
amendments to the LHWCA has had an especially potent effect on the shape of several aspects of law as interpreted by
the courts. For instance, a sentence in both the House and
Senate committee reports on the amendments to the effect
that the question of whether negligence existed in a particular
situation could "only be resolved through the application of
Manfred Stansfield, 186 F. Supp. 805 (E.D. Va. 1960).
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accepted principles of tort law and the ordinary process of litigation-just as they are in cases involving alleged negligence
by land-based third parties, ' 95 has led countless lower courts
to the conclusion that Congress, by using the phrase "landbased," meant to impose a standard of care similar to the
traditional common-law standard of care with regard to landowners and business invitees.98 Courts turned to the Restatement of Torts97 and established principles based on rules
which had their origins several centuries ago in England. Such
a literal resort to the committee reports and the legislative intent of Congress, as well as the adoption of land-based principles of tort law, distracted the attention of the courts from
the standard of care established in the maritime law by the
Supreme Court. 8 This effort by the lower courts to effect
what they thought was the legislative intent of Congress persisted until recently when several circuit courts cited a 1959
Supreme Court decision as being the better-reasoned standard
of care under traditional admiralty and maritime law
concepts.9a
It is risky for courts to seek support for a particular construction or interpretation in the legislative history of the
1972 amendments to the LHWCA.
Bills to amend the
LHWCA were introduced into both houses of Congress during
1971.100 Hearings were held by the applicable committees in

95. H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE
& AD. NEWS 4698, 4704 [hereinafter cited as 1972 House REP.]; S. REP. No.
1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 SEN. REP.].
96. See, e.g., Canizzo v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 682, 684-85 (2d Cir. 1978);
Samuels v. Empresa-Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, 573 F.2d 884, 885-86 (5th Cir.
1978); Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mariners Corp., Panama, 540 F.2d 757, 758-59 (4th
Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Frasca v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1092,
1097-98, 1100-01 (D. Md. 1975); Hite v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 380 F. Supp. 222,
226-27 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 343 & 343A (1965).
98. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630-32
(1959).
99. See Johnson v. A/S Ivarans Rederi, 613 F.2d 334, 347-48 (1st Cir. 1980); Griffith v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 610 F.2d 116, 122-26 (3d Cir. 1979); Santos v.
Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 598 F.2d 480, 483-88 (9th Cir. 1979) cert. granted sub
nom. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 100 S. Ct. 2150 (1980). See also
Gallardo v. Westfal-Larsen & Co. A/S, 435 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
100. S. 525, 92d Cong., 1st Seas., 117 CONG. REC. 1348-51 (1971); S. 2318, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REC. 26102-04 (1971). H.R. 247, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971); H.R. 3505, 92d Cong., 1st Seas. (1971); H.R. 12006, 92d Cong., 1st Seas. (1971).
CONG.
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both houses. 10 1 A Senate subcommittee held five days of hearings on several bills, and a House subcommittee held three
days of hearings on similar bills. Out of a total of eighteen
members assigned to the House select subcommittee, seven
members attended the first day, four members attended the
second day and five members attended the third day of hearings on the bills. 0 2 In the Senate subcommittee, which had a
total membership of twelve, two senators, the chairman and a
minority member of -the subcommittee, attended the first day
of hearings, and of these only the chairman was present on
the four remaining days. 03 The risk involved in a court's relying upon the legislative history of a statute such as the 1972
amendments can be shown by a recent Supreme Court case
where the Court stated, "The Senate Subcommittee on Labor
heard testimony that 30-35% of ship repair work is done on
land."' 0 The "Senate Subcommittee on Labor," to which the
Supreme Court referred, consisted that day of only one member, the chairman.20 5 Moreover, the chairman himself, the

only member present on that day, was not a sponsor of any of
the bills being considered and was not present on the Senate
floor when the amendments were voted on and adopted.108 It
is difficult to find compelling authority in reports issued by
congressional committees, most of whose members never
heard testimony or, perhaps, gave little, if any, prior consideration to the bills.
It is difficult also, in the case of the 1972 amendments to
the LHWCA, to find persuasive authority from the legislative
history worked out on the floor of either house during consideration of the bills. The Senate was the first body to consider
101. See Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments
of 1972; Hearingson S.2318, S. 525, and S.1547 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of
the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 Senate Hearings];Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972: Hearings on H.R. 247, H.R. 3505, H.R. 12006,
and H.R. 15023 Before the Select Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Educ.
and Labor, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 House Hearings].
102. See 1972 House Hearings,supra note 101, at 1, 65, 225.
103. Sen. Eagleton. See 1972 Senate Hearings,supra note 101, at 1, 53, 169, 255,
615.
104. P. C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 100 S. Ct. 328, 336 (1979).
105. Sen. Eagleton. See 1972 Senate Hearings,supra note 101, at 169.
106. See 118 CONG. REC. 36261 (1972).
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the 1972 amendments. On September 14, 1972,107 it passed
the amendments without modification, without debate and by
a voice vote. On Saturday, October 14, 1972, the House passed
its own version of the 1972 amendments under a legislative
procedure whereby debate was restricted to one hour and no
amendments were allowed to the bill.10 8 The debate on the bill
is not informative and consists of little more than a restatement of the committee reports and statutory language. It is
difficult to tell how many members of the House were present
for debate on the amendment, but it is significant that after
the debate had concluded and the speaker called for a division
vote on passage of the bill, only seventy-nine members responded, forty-eight in favor of passage and thirty-one
against. 10 9 Subsequently, a member of the House asked for a
roll call vote and 269 members responded, with 162 not voting.11 0 Even if a "legislative purpose or intent" could be gathered from the limited debate in the House, it is difficult to say
that such was the intent or purpose of a majority of the
House. Ordinarily, legislation as far-reaching as the 1972
amendments to the LHWCA would have been given considerable attention in both houses, and the resulting versions from
each probably would have been referred to a conference committee where a compromise between the two versions would
have been worked out. But in the case of the 1972 amendments, action on the bills was taken so late in the session and
so close to the time when many members of Congress were up
for reelection, that an expedited procedure was necessary.
After the House had passed a different version than the
one approved by the Senate, the amendments were sent back
to the Senate which then agreed to the House version with
only limited debate and again on a voice vote.' Again, it is
difficult to tell how many members of the Senate were present
for the debate, but almost forty senators were reported absent

107. See 118 CONG. REC. 30670-74 (1972).
108. See 118 CONG. REc. 36376-89, 36390-96 (1972).
109. See 118 CONG. REC. 36388 (1972). A division vote is called by the speaker
after the completion of debate and requires all members present in the chamber in
the affirmative of the question to first rise from their seats and be counted and then
those in the negative. House Rule I, 5, § 630 (1972).
110. 118 CONG. REC. 36388-89 (1972).
111. Id. at 36265-74.
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for the entire day when the bill was considered. 11 2 Debate in
the Senate the second time was limited to comments by the
sponsor of the 1972 amendments,11 3 and his remarks consisted
of a restatement of the Senate committee report.1 4 In fact,
some doubt exists as to whether he actually read his comments to those senators present since his remarks parallel almost word for word the text of the committee report, and it
was the practice at that time to give no indication in the Congressional Record whether or not a statement was actually
made on the floor of the Senate or whether it was merely inserted later when the Congressional Record was printed.115
If, in fact, he did not read his statements to those members of
the Senate present during consideration of the bill, but instead inserted them into the record ex post facto, then they
are entitled to little, if any, weight in fathoming a congressional intent."1 ' This is the environment in which the "legislative intent" of Congress was forged as to the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA. One member of the House subcommittee which was considering the 1972 amendments
stated at a committee meeting, after hearing testimony that a
great deal of compromise would be necessary in enacting the
amendments, "I think it is also important to write it on the
floor. The legislative history will have to be written on the
floor." 17 That same member was not even present during the
debate or vote in the full House on the 1972 amendments. 1 6
Congressional consideration of the 1972 amendments was
112. Id. at 36186-87, 36187-88, 36240, 36261.
113. Sen. Williams.

114. Compare remarks of Sen. Williams, 118 CONG. REC. 36270-73 (1972) with
1972 SEN. REP., supra note 95.

115. At the time of the debate on the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA, it was
not the practice of the CongressionalRecord to indicate by the use of "bullet" statements or insertions which were not spoken by a legislator on the floor, as is currently
the practice. See also Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 99 S. Ct. 2675, 2678 n.3 (1979).
116. See 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§
48.13-.14 (4th ed. 1973).
117. Remarks of Rep. Esch, 1972 House Hearings,supra note 101, at 120.
118. A short statement by Rep. Esch in support of the passage of the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA appears at 118 CONG. REc. 36388 (1972), for October 14, 1972,
the date the amendments were passed. It appears, however, that the statement was
never actually delivered on the floor of the House, and that Rep. Esch was not present for debate and voting since he is officially recorded as "not voting" and had
formed a pair with Rep. Fulton, who also did not vote on the bill. Id.
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haphazard. While the subject matter encompassed by the
amendments had been discussed in various House and Senate
committees for the previous twenty years," i9 House and Senate consideration in 1972 was not comprehensive, and its
meaningfulness is questionable.
The Supreme Court has ascribed to Congress three main
goals in enacting the 1972 amendments. "The primary purposes of the 1972 Amendments were to raise the amount of
compensation available under the Act, to abolish longshoremen's seaworthiness remedy against the owners of a vessel,
and to outlaw shipowners' claims for indemnification from
stevedores. ' 120 As mentioned above, Seas Shipping Co. v.
Sieracki1 2' and Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp.1 22 had created a situation wherein the shipowner
was absolutely liable for a breach of the judicially-enacted
warranty of seaworthiness, but could shift his burden of liability completely to the stevedore-employer upon a showing that
the stevedore had breached the judicially-created warranty of
workmanlike performance which required that the stevedore
perform his work in a safe and workmanlike manner. Consequently, what was referred to as a "circular liability" arrangement had been created whereby an injured longshoreman col-

119. H.R. 4032, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); Safety in Longshore and Harbor
Work, Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor on H.
R. 4032, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); H.R. 5357, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); H.R.
10119, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956); H.R. 11113, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1955); H.R.
11119, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956); H.R. 11234, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956); Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (Third Party Liability): Hearings Before a Special Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1956); LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT
(THIRD PARTY LIABILrrY), REP. BY ASPECIAL SUBCOMM. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC.
AND LABOR, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) (Comm. Print, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., Y4.Ed 8/
1:L86/4); H.R. 7344, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957) (no hearings); H.R. 6740, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1959) (no hearings); H.R. 207, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); Warranty of
Seaworthiness; Third Party Liability: House Hearings on H.R. 207 Before the Subcomm. on Merchant Marine of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 87th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. (1961-62) Pts. 1 and 2; H.R. REP. No. 1515, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) (recommended for passage by the committee; 7 members filed
a minority report); H.R. 76, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) (no hearings); S. 2485, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 113 CONG. REC. 27316-21 (1967); Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Amendments: Hearings on S. 2485 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st and 2d Seass. (1967-68).
120. P. C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 100 S. Ct. 328, 332 n. 3 (1979).
121. 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
122. 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
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lected unemployment benefits from his stevedore-employer
and also brought suit against a negligent third-party shipowner who, in turn, brought suit against the stevedore-employer for a breach of the warranty of workmanlike service.12 3
This circular arrangement led to the result that a stevedoreemployer was liable not only for compensation benefits, but
also in many cases was liable to indemnify the owner of the
vessel for any damages awarded in a court action. At the same
time that courts were working out the principles of the seaworthiness-indemnity cycle, longshoremen and their unions
were becoming appreciably discontented with the level of
compensation benefits paid to injured workers under the
LHWCA. The benefit level had not been increased since 1961
and had remained at seventy dollars per week even though
the average wage of a longshoreman had risen to two hundred
dollars per week by 1972.124 Several bills125 were introduced
into Congress in 1971 seeking to raise the level of benefits to a
higher maximum and to effect other changes in the provisions
of the LHWCA.
When hearings were held on the bills in both the House
and Senate, numerous representatives of both shipowners and
stevedore-employers testified. 126 The gist of their complaints
was that if the level of compensation benefits were to be
raised, they would demand in return that the circular liability
arrangement established by the Supreme Court in Sieracki
and Ryan be abolished. They claimed that the particular arrangement had the effect of raising compensation insurance
premiums to almost unbearable levels. One stevedore-employer representative went so far as to assert that if the benefit levels were raised without a concomitant abolishing of the
circular liability arrangement, many parts of the stevedoring
and shipping industries would be "push[ed] toward bank-

123. Of this arrangement Judge John Brown of the Fifth Circuit remarked in one
case: "This is another of the growing number of multi-party Donnybrook Fairs in
which like Kilkenny cats... all lash out against each other in the hope that someway from someone, somehow all or part of the Sieracki-Ryan-Yaka-Italia fallout can
be visited on another." D/S Ove Skou v. Hebert, 365 F.2d 341, 344 (5th Cir. 1966).
124. See 1972 SEN. REP., supra note 95, at 4.
125. See bills listed in note 100 supra.
126. See 1972 House Hearings, at H-iv, and 1972 Senate Hearings at IH-IV,
supra note 101.
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ruptcy . . .. ,
There was testimony at the hearings that
while the level of compensation benefits had remained constant since 1961, the accident frequency rate in the stevedoring industry had undergone a steady decline and that the rate
of severe injuries had declined substantially.1 2 However, during that same time the compensation insurance premium rate
had increased exponentially. 29 It was asserted that this was
due primarily to the increase in third-party suits brought by
injured longshoremen against vessel owners under the warranty of seaworthiness doctrine. The ease of recovery under
such a doctrine, it was claimed, gave incentive to commence
such third-party actions. 130 Evidence was presented by one
representative of stevedoring concerns that in 1963 in the district courts of New York just over twenty-seven percent of all
federal longshoremen claims that exceeded one thousand dollars had resulted in third-party suits."' By 1970, that rate had
increased to seventy-seven percent.13 2 Two primary reasons
were asserted for this increase in commencement of thirdparty actions. First, since 1961, the disparity between the
weekly compensation level paid under the LHWCA and the
actual weekly wage of the average longshoreman had increased. Second, under the warranty of seaworthiness doctrine, the absolute liability which rested on the shipowner
made recovery by an injured longshoreman an easily surmountable obstacle.
A raise in the level of weekly compensation benefits was
proposed. 13 3 Evidence was presented to the committees, however, that if the level of compensation benefits were raised

127. Statement and remarks of James A. Flynn, representing the New York Shipping Ass'n, Inc.; 1972 House Hearings at 91, 101, and 1972 Senate Hearings at 724,
supra note 101.
128. 1972 House Hearings at 93, 102, and 1972 Senate Hearings at 731-32, supra
note 101.
129. 1972 House Hearings, at 93, 102, and 1972 Senate Hearings at 730, 732,
supra note 101.
130. 1972 House Hearings,at 93, 102-03, and 1972 Senate Hearings at 732, supra
note 101.
131. 1972 House Hearings at 92, 101, and 1972 Senate Hearings at 729, supra
note 101.
132. 1972 House Hearings at 92, 102, and 1972 Senate Hearings at 729, supra
note 101.
133. Most of the bills discussed at the hearings proposed a benefit level increase
of some kind. See bills listed in note 100 supra.
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without a concurrent change in the circular liability arrangement, compensation insurance premiums would rise, depending upon the proposal adopted, anywhere from fifty-three to
one hundred twenty-eight percent.134 The stevedore-employers and shipowners first proposed to include a vessel under
the definition of an "employer" under the provisions of the
LHWCA. 1 5 This would have immunized the vessel against
suit by an injured longshoreman, since the LHWCA provides
that an injured harbor worker may not bring a third-party action against his "employer." Even though the stevedore
would, in fact, be the real employer of the injured harbor
worker, a change in the definition of that term under the
LHWCA encompassing the vessel would thereby make the
vessel a fictional "employer" of the longshoreman. This would
have had the effect of barring all suits against the vessel,
whether for negligence or for the breach of the warranty of
seaworthiness. During the hearings on this proposal, which
was introduced in both houses of Congess, a consensus quickly
developed that a negligence action should be retained, while
the warranty of seaworthiness should be abolished. 186 Stevedore-employers then argued that if the vessel owner's absolute
warranty of seaworthiness was to be abolished, their duty to
indemnify a vessel owner for a breach of the warranty of
workm.nlike performance should also be abolished. This was
agreed to with little opposition. The remaining portions of the
hearing records in both houses contain little more than repetitions of why the warranty of seaworthiness and the warranty
of workmanlike performance should be done away with, and
statements from union spokesmen that the level of compensation benefits should be increased.
Perhaps the most significant part of any of the testimony
given before either committee occurred during a portion of a
Senate committee hearing when one of the committee's counsel was questioning an attorney representing the National

134. Statement and remarks of James A. Flynn, supra note 127. See 1972 House
Hearings at 93-94, 103, and 1972 Senate Hearings at 733, supra note 101.
135. See S. 525, 93d Cong., 1st Seas., 117 CONG. REC. 1348-51 (1971); H.R. 247,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
136. See 1972 House Hearings at 50-64, 117, 1972 Senate Hearings at 33-37, 27074, supra note 101.
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Maritime Compensation Committee.1 3 7 The colloquy was as
follows:
Mr. Mittelman. Do you know whether it is a common
practice in the Port of Philadelphia and other ports for
stevedores ... to include in their contract with shipowners,
a hold-harmless clause under which the stevedore agrees to
hold the shipowner harmless even from the result of the
shipowner's own negligence if it causes an injury to one of
the stevedore's employees?
Mr. Scanlan. Mr. Mittelnan, I think there are some
cases where that has happened, and it all depends on the
contract and the contractual relationship between the parties, the shipowner, and the stevedore.
That's the typical hold-harmless agreement.
Mr. Mittelman. If we wrote into this a prohibition, a
hold-harmless clause to the extent that they hold a shipowner harmless for injuries due to the shipowner's own negligence, plus a provision which authorized third-party action
only where there was negligence on the part of the shipowner as a third party, wouldn't that protect the stevedore
from the circular liability that he now develops [sic]?
Mr. Scanlan. Yes; that would give him a great deal of
protection. It wouldn't be complete protection, because of
the fact that you have stated, that you would retain the
right of a longshoreman to bring a suit against the shipowner for negligence.
Mr. Mittelman. There is a precedent for this. I think it is
section ...
[234] of the New York State real property
law,138 which prohibits an owner of a building from getting a

137. Colloquy between Eugene Mittelman, minority counsel to the Senate Comm.
on Labor and Public Welfare, and Francis Scanlan, representing the National Maritime Compensation Comm.
138. Section 234 N.Y. Real Property Law (Consol.) was added to the statutes by
1937 N.Y. Laws. ch. 907, and renumbered as § 5-321 N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Laws (McKinney) by 1963 N.Y. Laws ch. 576. It reads as follows:
Every covenant, agreement or understanding in or in connection with or
collateral to any lease of real property exempting the lessor from liability for
damages for injuries to person or property caused by or resulting from the negligence of the lessor, his agents, servants or employees, in the operation or
maintenance of the demised premises or the real property containing the demised premises shall be deemed to be void as against public policy and wholly
unenforceable.
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hold harmless because from, say, the maintenance contractor under which the maintenance contractor agrees to indemnify the owner of the building from the result of his own
negligence. There is a precedent for this sort of thing.
What I am getting at is a system that permits the thirdparty action and then prohibits the shipowner from coming
back against the stevedore." 9
What the committee counsel was proposing was allowing an
injured longshoreman to sue a third party for negligence while
eliminating the absolute doctrine of seaworthiness and foreclosing the possibility that a shipowner would require a stevedore to execute an indemnity agreement. By prohibiting any
indemnity agreements, the effect of the Ryan doctrine of the
warranty of workmanlike service (as well as ny attempt to
resurrect such a doctrine in the form of an express indemnity
agreement) would be nullified.
The attention of these subcommittees and their respective
counsel was directed primarily, if not exclusively, to three parties: the injured longshoreman, the shipowner and the stevedore-employer. No testimony focused on and no attention was
given to any situations involving more than those parties. The
focus was on achieving a workable compromise whereby benefit levels could be substantially increased under the LHWCA
in return for relieving shipowners and stevedore-employers
from the burden imposed by the Sieracki-Ryan circular liability arrangement. If the committee hearings are any indication
of the thoroughness with which Congress examined and balanced the competing interests of the various groups represented before it, then it might be fairly stated that little if any
balancing was undertaken. As the above-quoted comments by
the counsel to the committee suggest, everyone was in agreement that the compensation benefit level should be raised.
The only question was how to provide that negligence actions
be allowed to be commenced by an injured longshoreman or
harbor worker while abolishing the dual warranties of seaworthiness and workmanlike performance. Congress' attention
did not go beyond the evidence presented by the witnesses
testifying before the committees. The longshoremen wanted
increased compensation benefits. The shipowners and steve139. 1972 Senate Hearings,supra note 101, at 272-73 (footnote added).
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dore-employers wanted to be relieved of circular liability
suits. A compromise was worked out, and the legislation was
passed. 140
The 1972 amendments to the LHWCA removed most, if
not all, of the Sieracki-Ryan legacy from the maritime law of
personal injury to longshoremen and harbor workers."' The
question remains as to what effect the removal of so pervasive
and encompassing a body of doctrine and rules, stretching
from 1946 to 1972, would have on the law in this area. The
committee reports assert that removal of the Sieracki-Ryan
doctrine clears the way for application of the "admiralty concept of comparative negligence.

' 14 2

Whether this is, in fact,

the case depends upon whether a "concept" of comparative
negligence existed in the maritime law of personal injury to
longshoremen and harbor workers prior to the twenty-six year
predominance of the Sieracki-Ryan liability scheme.
Initially, it is sufficient to define the concept of comparative negligence as a system of loss allocation providing for the
apportionment of damage in some manner according to the
fault of the parties involved. This is in contrast to the traditional common-law rule barring recovery to a party seeking
damages if his own negligence was found to have contributed
to his harm. A concept of a sharing or dividing of the damages
first took hold in the maritime law of collision.
The first mention of dividing the loss in the Anglo-American maritime law occurred in 1614.1"s The defendant in that
case was found solely at fault and was made to pay one-half of
the loss of the ship's cargo and the entire amount for damages
140. The amendments replaced the fixed weekly benefit rate with a percent
formula correlated to the "national average wage" as determined by the Secretary of
Labor. This scheme eliminated the need for Congress to continually adjust the benefit schedule by legislation to keep up with inflation. Additionally, death benefits paid
to survivors were increased for widows and children; benefits to surviving children

were made payable until age 23 if the child was attending school; funeral expenses up
to a fixed amount were payable; and compensation benefits were made available in
cases of serious disfigurement. A revamped administrative procedure was also

included.
141. See text accompanying notes 202-42 infra.
142. 1972 HOUSE RP. at 8,reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
4705; 1972 SEN. REP. at 12, supra note 95.
143. See Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 189,

226 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Turk].
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to the ship itself.144 This case was not, strictly speaking, a case
of comparative negligence since the plaintiff was not at fault,
but it introduced into the maritime law the concept of dividing damages as opposed to allowing a plaintiff either complete
or no recovery. There are other instances where the defendant
vessel was solely at fault and the English courts awarded onehalf damages to the plaintiff. 4 5 Decisions from the same period, however, indicate that sometimes a court would allow recovery in an amount other than one-half of the damages
where only the defendant was at fault.14 6 In other instances
the court apportioned the loss according to the relative fault
of the parties. 47 By the end of the seventeenth century, however, the general rule was to apply one-half damages in the
event of collision when two vessels were at fault. 4' 8
In 1695, the rule of one-half damages was first applied to a
case of fault on the part of both the plaintiff and the defendant.14 9 A 1706 case revised the equal division rule on the difficulty of accurately attributing the fault among the parties
involved.1 50 Throughout the eighteenth century, the English
admiralty courts followed the equal division rule, even in
cases of mutual fault, and avoided any attempts to allocate
loss according to relative degree of fault.1 51 In the early 1820's,
one admiralty trial court, in a case where both vessels were
found at fault, apportioned the loss in unequal shares. 52 On
appeal, however, the House of Lords criticized that method of
allocation and directed the division of loss in equal shares. 5 8
This remained the rule in England until modified by a statute
in 1911 providing for apportionment of loss according to the
relative degree of fault.1 "
American admiralty courts were quick to adopt the En-

144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 227.

149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 228.
153. Hay v. LeNeve, 2 Shaw Sc. App. Cas. 395 (H.L. 1824), cited in Turk, supra
note 143, at 228.
154. Turk, supra note 143, at 228.
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glish rule of equal shares in collision cases of mutual fault.'55
In 1855, the Supreme Court held that this was the proper rule
for the federal courts to apply. 156 The Court failed to consider
whether this rule would apply if one vessel were grossly more
at fault than the other or whether it would ever be proper to
allocate loss according to degree of fault. This was so despite
the fact that the Court earlier in the century had enunciated
principles of maritime law which seemed to indicate a more
careful consideration of the amount of blame attributable to a
party. In The MariannaFlora,157 the Court stated, "Even in
cases of marine torts. . . courts of admiralty are in the habit
of giving or withholding damages upon enlarged principles of
"I5 And a flexible standard was indijustice and equity. . ...
cated in The Palmyra 59 where it was noted, "In the admiralty, the award of damages always rests in the sound discretion of the court, under all circumstances." 6 By 1874, the
Court was able to assert, "By the rule of the admiralty court,
when there has been such contributory negligence, or in other
words, when both have been at fault, the entire damages resulting from the collision must be equally divided between the
parties."'"'
By the end of the nineteenth century, some lower federal
courts had issued decisions apportioning loss unequally according to relative fault, 6 2 but such innovation was shortlived. The courts continued to utilize the equal division rule
until the Supreme Court once again entered the area and
abolished the rule in 1975 in favor of a proportionate fault
63
rule.1
The previous discussion of the one hundred twenty-year
old divided damages rule in collision cases has not mentioned

155. Id. at 231.
156. The Schooner Catherine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 434 (1855).
157. 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 497 (1826).

158. Id. at 509.
159. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).

160. Id. at 10.
161. Atlee v. Packet Co., 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 389, 395 (1874).

162. See, e.g., The Chattahoochee, 74 F. 899 (1st Cir. 1896); The Victory, 68 F.
395 (4th Cir. 1895); The Mary Ida, 20 F. 741 (S.D. Ala. 1884). See also N. M. Pater1962) (apportioning
son & Sons, Ltd. v. City of Chicago, 209 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Ill.

liability

Ys-%),

rev'd, 324 F.2d 254 (7th Cir. 1963).

163. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975).

1980]

LHWCA AND COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE

any role Congress took in seeking to modify or abolish it. As
mentioned above, the same rule in England was nullified by
an act of Parliament in 1911. From its general recognition by
the Supreme Court in 1855, the divided damages rule was
considered only by the courts until 1911. In that year, encouraged by the text adopted by the International Maritime
Convention approved in Brussels in 1910, the President and
Secretary of State attempted to draft legislation similar to the
English act of 1911, but abandoned their efforts when strong
protests against such a change were raised.1 In 1937, the
President again submitted the Convention calling for a proportionate division of damages in collision cases to the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, which reported favorably on
it. 165 The intervention of World War II, however, foreclosed
further action, and the President subsequently withdrew the
Convention from further congressional consideration in
1947.1 6 No other legislative attempts were made to modify
the doctrine before the Supreme Court acted in 1975.
The maritime concept of comparative negligence more
quickly overcame the equal division rule in situations where
the negligence of the plaintiff concurred with that of the defendant to cause a personal injury or death. Not foreclosed
from awarding damages other than in equal shares as they
were in the field of collision cases, the lower courts felt free to
exercise the traditional hallmarks of admiralty jurisprudence-discretion and equity. By 1884, Judge Pardee of the
Fifth Circuit, in two important decisions, 6 7 felt "disposed to
hold that in cases of maritime tort, it is the rule of courts of
admiralty to exercise 'a conscientious discretion and give or
withhold damages upon enlarged principles of justice and equity.) ,,I'l
In deciding the case, the court stated that it did
not find that outside of collision and prize cases, the admiralty courts have claimed or exercised a different rule as to
cases of contributory, concurrent, or comparative negligence
from that applied generally in courts of law and equity, in
164. Turk, supra note 143, at 234-35.
165. Id. at 235.
166. Id. at 235-36.
167. The Explorer, 20 F. 135 (C.C.E.D. La. 1884); The Wanderer, 20 F. 140 (C.C.
E.D. La. 1884).
168. The Explorer, 20 F. 135, 139 (C.C.E.D. La. 1884).
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cases of damage and torts committed or suffered on
land.... [The court has] not been able to find a case where
a seaman, freighter, or passenger, injured through his own
negligence, has been allowed to recover damages outside of
care and attendance from the ship or her owners."" 9
Nonetheless, Judge Pardee, in one case where a harbor worker
was injured when he caught his arm in the wheels of a revolving steam winch as a result of both his own negligence and the
negligence of the vessel he was working on, did not divide
damages equally, but allowed the injured worker some of his
special but not his general damages. 170 In another case, Judge
Pardee awarded a seaman, who was concurrently negligent
with a vessel, damages to the extent of the cost of direct care,
attention, medical services and expenses.17 1 The court deemed
recovery "not as a compensation for the injury, but as required by decency and humanity from a party without whose
17 2
fault there would have been no injury.
Following this example, federal courts thereafter began to
allow damages proportionate to the circumstances and not according to a set rule of equal division.17 3 Nonetheless, a trial
court occasionally would do so, citing the "admiralty rule," 7 4
but the pervading rule for personal injury cases was stated by
an Oregon district court as follows: 5 "When the negligence is
concurrent, or both parties are in fault, courts of admiralty
will apportion the damages or give or withhold them, in the
exercise of a sound discretion, according to principles of equity and justice, considering all of the circumstances of the
176
case."'
Any doubts on the matter were resolved by the Supreme
Court in 1890. The trial court in The Max Morris7 7 had

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id.
Id. at 140.
The Wanderer, 20 F. 140, 143 (C.C.E.D. La. 1884).
Id.
See, e.g., Anderson v. The Ashebrooke, 44 F. 124, 127-28 (C.C.E.D. Tex.

1890); The Mystic, 44 F. 398, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1890); The Truro, 31 F. 158, 160
(E.D.N.Y. 1887); The Max Morris, 24 F. 860, 862-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1885); The Mabel
Comeaux, 24 F. 490, 491-92 (C.C.E.D. La. 1885).
174. See, e.g., The Eddystone, 33 F. 925, 927 (E.D. Va. 1887).
175. Olson v. Flavel, 34 F. 477 (D. Ore. 1888).

176. Id. at 479.
177. 24 F. 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1885).
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awarded an injured harbor worker his loss of wages, but required him to bear all pain and suffering and consequential
damages as a result of the finding of concurrent negligence. 1 8
The trial court found Judge Pardee's decisions persuasive and
stated that the "practice in admiralty to apportion damages in
cases of mutual fault is not strictly confined" to nonpersonal
injury cases. 179 In allowing the injured longshoreman to recover his lost wages, the court stated, "Such a rule will certainly not diminish the care of laborers for their own safety,
while it will surely tend to quicken the attention of the owners
and masters of vessels toward providing all needful means for
the safety of life and limb."180
The circuit court affirmed 81 and on appeal to the Supreme
Court the district court's holding was sustained in broad language. The Court found the rule allowing some recovery to a
concurrently negligent injured longshoreman or harbor worker
to be "an amelioration of the common-law rule, and an extension of the admiralty rule, in a direction which we think is
manifestly just and proper. ' '182 Commenting on the decision of

the district court, the Supreme Court agreed with its holding.
We think this rule is applicable to all like cases of marine
tort, founded upon negligence, and prosecuted in admiralty,
as in harmony with the rule for the division of damages in
cases of collision. The mere fact of a negligence of the libelant as partly occasioning the injuries to him, when they also
occurred partly through the negligence of the officers of the
vessel, does not debar him entirely from a recovery.1 83
The court found it unnecessary to give an opinion about
whether "in a case like this the decree should be for exactly
one-half of the damages sustained, or might, in the discretion
of the court, be for a greater or lesser proportion of such damages ... "I" But since the district court and circuit court
had allowed damages based on a rule other than the one-half
division rule and the Supreme Court did not disturb that
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 864.
Id. at 863.
Id. at 864.
28 F. 881 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886).
137 U.S. 1, 14 (1890).
Id. at 15.
Id.
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award, the implication was that federal courts need not apply
a strict divided damage rule in personal injury cases. Thereafter, the federal courts consistently applied a rule of comparative negligence when both the plaintiff and defendant were at
fault for causing the injury, repeating the rule that contributory negligence did not bar recovery, but served only to reduce the damages allowed. 8 5
After the 1927 enactment of a workers' compensation act
covering longshoremen and harbor workers, 188 the number of
actions brought by such injured employees to recover under
the comparative negligence doctrine diminished. The act as
originally passed provided that the acceptance by a worker of
compensation benefits operated as an automatic assignment
to his employer of his third-party cause of action against a
negligent vessel or other party.1 8 Thus, an injured longshoreman or harbor worker seeking a third-party damage recovery
had to completely forego acceptance of benefits in the interim, a hardship most chose not to undergo. 8 8
Nonetheless, the courts continued to develop the doctrine
of comparative negligence in actions brought by injured
seamen 18 9 and in certain other instances.19 0 As discussed
above, 1 however, the Supreme Court had in 1903 in The Osceola"9 2 held that a seaman could not recover against the vessel for injuries caused by the vessel's negligence. Congress

185. See, e.g., Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 289 F. 964, 976 (2d Cir. 1923); Storgard v. France & Canada S.S. Corp., 263 F. 545 (2d Cir. 1920), cert. denied, 252 U.S.
585 (1921); Cricket S.S. Co. v. Parry, 263 F. 523, 526 (2d Cir. 1920); John A. Roebling's Sons Co. v. Erickson, 261 F. 986, 987 (2d Cir. 1919); Carter v. Brown, 212 F.
393, 395 (5th Cir. 1914); The Scandinavia, 156 F. 403, 406-07 (D. Me. 1907); The
Lackawanna, 151 F. 499, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1907); The Julia Fowler, 49 F. 277, 279
(S.D.N.Y. 1892); The Frank & Willie, 45 F. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1891).
186. See note 61 supra.
187. Ch. 509, § 33, 44 Stat. 1440 (1927).
188. And the Act was so construed. See American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330
U.S. 446, 454-56 (1947); Toomey v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 123 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1941);
The Nako Maru, 101 F.2d 716 (3d Cir. 1939). Contra, Johnsen v. American-Hawaiian
S.S. Co., 98 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1938).
189. See, e.g., Cricket S.S. Co. v. Parry, 263 F. 523 (2d Cir. 1920).
190. E.g., Ahlgren v. Red Star Towing & Transp. Co., 214 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1954)
(diversity action); Guerrini v. United States, 167 F.2d 352 (2d Cir. 1948) (L. Hand, J.)
(action under Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-52 (1944)); Stokes v. United
States, 144 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944) (same).
191. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
192. 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
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changed that rule in 1920 with passage of the Jones Act,193

which allowed a seaman to recover against a shipowner and a
vessel even when there was concurrent negligence. Thus, development of the principle of comparative negligence by the
federal court regarding seamen was guided by the terms of the
statute and .not by the "admiralty concept of comparative
negligence." Even recovery under the Jones Act comparative
negligence rule fell into disuse after the Supreme Court's decision in 1944 holding a vessel absolutely liable under the warranty of seaworthiness to an injured seaman. 9 ' The Court's
similar holding two years later gave injured longshoremen and
harbor workers little incentive to pursue a recovery under
principles of comparative negligence in actions against third
parties under the LHWCA.19 5 However, even in unseaworthi-

ness actions, contributory negligence served to proportionately reduce recoveries. In and of itself, this was an application of true comparative negligence.196
Instances of the application of comparative negligence
under the general maritime law did continue to occur in the
federal courts from 1927 to 1972.

In 1953, the Supreme

Court decided a case 98 in which the shipowner contended
that the maritime law had "not developed any definite rule as
to the effect of contributory negligence, and therefore the
common law rule under which contributory negligence bars
recovery should govern in admiralty. . . ."191 In rejecting this

contention, the Court reasserted that the rule of comparative
negligence prevails in admiralty actions.
The harsh rule of the common law under which contrib193. See note o45 supra.
194. Matnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
195. Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Co., 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
196. See cases in note 226 infra.
197. See, e.g., Mroz v. Dravo Corp., 429 F.2d 1156, 1164 (3d Cir. 1970); Haynes v.
Rederi A/S Aladdin, 362 F.2d 345, 348 n.3 (5th Cir. 1966); Manning v. MN Sea Road,
358 F.2d 615, 617 (5th Cir. 1965); Flowers v. Savannah Machine & Foundry Co., 310
F.2d 135, 138 (5th Cir. 1962); Nygren v. American Boat Cartage, Inc., 290 F.2d 547,
548 (2d Cir. 1961); Hardy v. United States, 322 F. Supp. 660, 663 (E.D.N.C. 1970);
Webster v. Davis, 109 F. Supp. 149, 152-53 (S.D. Cal. 1952); Palardy v. United States,
102 F. Supp. 534, 539 (E.D. Pa. 1952); Badalamenti v. United States, 67 F. Supp. 575,
580 (E.D.N.Y. 1946).
198. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
199. Id. at 408.
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utory negligence wholly barred an injured person from recovery is completely incompatible with modern admiralty
policy and practice. Exercising its traditional discretion, admiralty has developed and now follows its own fairer and
more flexible rule which allows such consideration of contributory negligence in mitigation of damages as justice requires. Petitioner presents no persuasive arguments that admiralty should now adopt a discredited doctrine which
automatically destroys all claims of injured persons who
have contributed to their injuries in any degree, however
2 00
slight.
It can be fairly stated that there did, in fact, exist an "admiralty concept of comparative negligence" prior to the enactment of the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA. However, it
had fallen somewhat into disuse since the rise of the warranty
of seaworthiness (except for its contributory negligence application to reduce recoverable damages) which made recovery
simpler for injured longshoremen and harbor workers. Nevertheless, the evidence was so insubstantial that American admiralty law had moved in the direction of a comprehensive
and specific system for distribution of loss on a comparative
basis that the Supreme Court, even in 1953, was able to say
only that the policy in admiralty was to allow "such consideration of contributory negligence in mitigation of damages as
justice requires.2 0 1 No uniform means had been developed
for precisely defining the manner in which the concurrent
negligence of an injured longshoreman or harbor worker
would operate to diminish his recovery against a negligent
party.
IV.

A.

DIAGNOSIS

Warranties

The 1972 amendments to the LHWCA undeniably eliminated a vessel's absolute, nondelegable duty of seaworthiness
as it relates to longshoremen and harbor workers. Section
905(b) states that the "liability of the vessel under this subsection shall not be based upon the warranty of seaworthiness

200. Id. at 408-09.
201. Id. at 409 (emphasis added).
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or a breach thereof at the time the injury occurred."202 As the
Supreme Court has recognized, this language explicitly nullifies the rule established in Sieracki and forecloses an injured
employee from maintaining an action for unseaworthiness
against a vessel. 20 3 The apparent rationale for this change was

stated in the committee reports.
The Committee believes that especially with the vast improvement in compensation benefits which the bill would
provide, there is no compelling reason to continue to require
vessels to assume what amounts to absolute liability for injuries which occurred to longshoremen or other workers covered under the Act who are injured while working on those
vessels .... The rationale which justifies holding the vessel

absolutely liable to seamen if the vessel is unseaworthy does
not apply with equal force to longshoremen and other non20
seamen working on board a vessel while it is in port. '

In place of recovery on the basis of breach of warranty of seaworthiness, an injured longshoreman may bring a third-party
action predicated on a shipowner's negligence. This provides
an injured employee with the opportunity to seek a thirdparty recovery from a tortfeasor but not under the guise of
any special maritime theory of liability.
The explicit effect of the 1972 amendments on the doctrine of warranty of workmanlike performance from a stevedore or repairman and the correlative right of indemnification
of a shipowner is uncertain. Section 905(b) states that the
"employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages
directly or indirectly and any agreements or warranties to the
contrary shall be void.

205

The accompanying committee re-

ports to the amendments attempt to be explanatory.
The Committee also believes that the doctrine of the Ryan
case, which permits the vessel to recover the damages for
202. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976).
203. See, e.g., Bloomer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 100 S. Ct. 925, 930 (1980); P.C.
Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 100 S. Ct. 328, 332 n.3 (1979); Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique, 99 S. Ct. 2753, 2757 (1979); Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v.
Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 260-61 & n.18 (1977); Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke,
Inc., 417 U.S. 106, 113 n.6 (1974).
204. 1972 HousE REP. at 5-6, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS at
4703; 1972 SEN. REP. at 9-10, supra note 95.
205. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976).
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which it is liable to an injured worker where it can show that
the stevedore breaches an express or implied warranty of
workmanlike performance is no longer appropriate if the
vessel's liability is no longer to be absolute, as it essentially
is under the seaworthiness doctrine. Since the vessel's liability is to be based on its own negligence, and the vessel will
no longer be liable under the seaworthiness doctrine for injuries which are really the fault of the stevedore, there is no
longer any necessity for permitting the vessel to recover the
damages for which it is liable to the injured worker from the
stevedore or other employer of the worker.20 6
The testimony presented by stevedoring representatives at
the committee hearings dealt with the effect the full indemnity doctrine had on stevedore-employers subject to the Ryan
warranty of workmanlike performance implied in a service
contract with a vessel. The Ryan doctrine was objectionable
because it placed full liability on a stevedore-employer whenever he caused or brought into play an unseaworthy condition
on the vessel. Even though there might have been a joint
sharing of fault, a breach of the Ryan warranty of workmanlike performance made the stevedore-employer fully liable to
indemnify the vessel for any resulting damages to a longshoreman or harbor worker.
Initially, one must remember the distinct difference between the imposition of a warranty of workmanlike perform207
ance and a duty to indemnify a third party. As some courts
have recognized, the warranty of workmanlike performance is
a contract-based doctrine by which there is implied in a service agreement a promise that a party will undertake its duties properly and safely. In the context of the Ryan case, the
Court implied a promise by the stevedore-employer "to stow
the cargo in a reasonably safe manner. '20 8 However, the Ryan
Court's creation of a doctrine of workmanlike performance
under such circumstances was a departure from what is commonly thought of as a warranty. Generally, warranties such as

206. 1972 HOUSE REP. at 7, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws at
4704; 1972 SEN. REP. at 11, supra note 95.
207. See, e.g., Navieros Oceanikos, S.A. v. S.T. Mobil Trader, 554 F.2d 43, 46-47
(2d Cir. 1977); Fairmount Shipping Corp. v. Chevron Int'l Oil Co., 511 F.2d 1252,
1259 (2d Cir. 1975).
208. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 132 (1956).
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the those of merchantibility, 20 9 fitness for a particular purpose, 210 and habitability, '

imply a promise by a manufac-

turer or seller that a product or item will function as intended
or advertised to the public, or that it will be fit for its intended or reasonably expected purpose. None of these warranties contains an implied promise that the manufacturer or
seller has constructed or assembled a particular product in a
reasonably safe and proper manner. The promise implied in a
warranty stresses the end result, or operation, of the object
sold and warranted. There is no emphasis on the manner in
which the seller or manufacturer constructed or prepared the
item. The focus is on whether the thing sold or warranted will
be in the condition which a reasonable person might expect,
or that it will operate as one might reasonably expect.
The warranty of workmanlike performance or service, as it
has evolved from Ryan, has come to mean not that, like a carpenter or plumber, one warrants that the finished product
will meet workmanlike standards, but that the actual manner
of operation and conduct of a party will be carried out in a
proper and safe way, that is, that the party will not be negligent or careless in the carrying out of its duties and services.21 2 Thus, as construed by many courts, the warranty of
workmanlike service is held to be a promise by a party that it
will not be negligent under the circumstances. 21 ' Of course, if
this is all that is meant by a warranty of workmanlike performance, it is superfluous, for the tort law imposes such a
standard of conduct on all persons under all circumstances.
There is no reason to construct a contractual fiction to accomplish the same objective. Unfortunately, many courts have
done just that. They have implied into many service agreements a promise that the contracted party will not cause injury or damage by improper, unsafe or incompetent perform209. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (1972).
210. Id. at § 2-315.
211. See Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1972); Javon v.
First Nat'l Realty Co., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii
426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969). See also Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act §
2.104 (1972).
212. See, e.g., Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Boston Line and Serv. Co., 286 F.
Supp. 399 (D. Mass. 1968); Barbey Packing Corp. v. The S.S. Stavros, 169 F. Supp.
897 (D. Ore. 1959).
213. Id.
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ance. Warranties have been found in such situations as a
contract of towage, 214 a contract between a shipyard and a
ship,"" a contract between a painting contractor and a ship, 21 6
a contract for ship repair, 217 a contract for ship cleaning, 2 ' 8220a
219 a pilot's contract with a ship,
contract for launch service,
and a contract to do work on a ship's engines. 221 The focus,

however, in all of those situations was not on the accomplishment of a workmanlike result, (for instance, a proper paint
job or repair of a ship's engine) but, rather, on the manner of
operation by the contracted party in undertaking its assigned
duties. A focus which goes to the proper and safe manner of
operation of a particular undertaking is best served by the law
of negligence, which imposes a duty of reasonable care under
the circumstances, or, if a higher standard is necessary, by a
tort law of strict liability. The imposition in such situations of
a contractually implied promise or warranty covering the
manner of operations is awkward and impractical. For one
thing, liability for breach of a warranty is usually limited to
those damages which might fairly be supposed to have been in
the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was
made or which might naturally be expected to follow the
breach of a warranty.2 22 Under a recovery based on negligence
or strict liability, however, the damages would not be limited
merely to those which were foreseeable, but to those which
are, in fact, caused in any way by the negligent or strictly liable act.2 23 Additionally, when two or more parties are jointly
214. Tebbs v. Baker-Whiteley Towing Co., 407 F.2d 1055, 1058-59 (4th Cir. 1969);
James McWilliams Blue Line, Inc. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 245 F.2d 84, 87 (2d Cir.
1957); Dunbar v. Henry Du Bois' Sons Co., 275 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1960).
215. American Export Lines v. Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp., 336 F.2d
525, 527 (4th Cir. 1964).
216. Mortensen v. A/S Glittre, 348 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1965).
217. H & H Ship Serv. Co. v. Weyerhaeuser Line, 382 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1967).
218. Giaraffa v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 342, 349 (S.D.N.Y.
1967).
219. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Boston Line & Serv. Co., 286 F. Supp. 399,
401 (D. Mass. 1968).
220. Barbey Packing Corp. v. The S.S. Stavros, 169 F. Supp. 897, 903-04 (D. Ore.
"A
1959).
221. Booth S.S. Co. v. Meier & Oelhaf Co., 262 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1958).
222. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-American S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 129 n.3
(1956); 22 AM. JuR. 2d Damages § 56 (1965); 63 Am. JUR. 2d Products Liability §§
224-25 (1972).
223. See 22 A. JuR. 2d Damages § 56 (1956).
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liable for causing damage or injury, apportionment of fault
under a breach of warranty theory is extremely difficult. Either a warranty is breached or it is not, and attributing a percentage of fault to each of several parties, all subject to separate and distinct warranties, would be an unwieldy, if not
impossible, task. Such apportionment of fault is better served
by applying the principles of tort law and comparative
negligence.
The primary reason for rejecting the imposition of a warranty of workmanlike performance on stevedore-employers in
light of the enactment of the 1972 amendments is a more fundamental one. It is difficult to deny that the absolute, nondelegable warranty of seaworthiness imposed on vessels was
the raison d'9tre for the creation of a warranty of workmanlike performance in the first place. While reasoning on the basis of post hoc ergo propter hoc is seldom profitable, in this
situation it appears pertinent. As the warranty of seaworthiness evolved from the court's decision in Sieracki, a shipowner was held absolutely liable, even for the acts or omissions of stevedores or employees of stevedores. He was also
subject to liability for the manner or method in which stevedores or employees of stevedores performed their assigned
work, and for defects in the gear or equipment of stevedores
whether used aboard the ship or ashore.2 24 In effect, a shipowner became almost an insurer of the safety of all persons
involved in any maritime activities which had a relation to the
ship.2 25 The inherent unfairness of subjecting a shipowner or
ship to absolute liability, when he had no knowledge of or
means to correct a defective condition or when an operation
carried out by persons not under his employ or control was
done in a negligent manner causing damage or injury, was evident to the Court and in the Ryan decision it sought to remedy that unfair situation. Rather than abolishing the absolute
duty imposed by the warranty of seaworthiness, the Court
sought instead to shift the entire burden of liability to the
more blameworthy of the two parties in what the Court felt

224. See, e.g., A. & G. Stevedores v. Ellerman Lines, 369 U.S. 355 (1962); Blassingill v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 336 F.2d 367 (9th Cir. 1964); Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954).
225. See note 71 supra.
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was the majority of the situations, i.e., to the stevedore-employer. After Ryan, while a shipowner still had an absolute
duty to provide a seaworthy vessel, and was liable for a breach
of that warranty, if the shipowner could show that another
party was partially or wholly responsible for the creation or
maintenance of the unseaworthy condition, he could shift the
entire burden of liability to that party. There was no apportionment of liability; either the shipowner was absolutely and
fully liable or someone else was. 228 The Court constructed this
arrangement by creating a rule that a service agreement between a shipowner and another party included within it an
agreement to indemnify the shipowner (and his ship) if any
act of the other party should cause or bring into play a condition of unseaworthiness of the vessel.2 27 To effect this promise
of indemnification, the Court constructed a contract-based
warranty of workmanlike performance. 228 Thus, whenever a
stevedore-employer breached its warranty of proper and safe
performance by, for instance, negligently undertaking a task
thereby causing or bringing into play an unseaworthy condition on the vessel, it was required by reason of the imposed
duty of indemnification to reimburse the vessel fully for any
and all damages caused. Even though both the shipowner and
the stevedore-employer might have been at fault in causing a
particular injury to a longshoreman or harbor worker, the
Court felt that as long as one party was to be entirely liable
for any injuries caused, it ought to be the "stevedore company
which brings its gear on board [and] knows the history of its
prior use and is in a position to establish retirement schedules
and periodic retests so as to discover defects and thereby insure safety of operations."2 29 Whether absolute liability for a
particular injury would fall fully on the shipowner or the stevedore-employer in a particular situation was a decision to
impose liability on the "party best situated to adopt preventive measures and thereby to reduce the likelihood of in-

226. A plaintiff's contributory negligence did, however, serve to reduce his recovery. See, e.g., Adams v. United States, 393 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1968); Antoine v. Lake
Charles Stevedores, Inc., 376 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1967).
227. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).

228. Id.
229. Italia Societa per Azioni Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S.
315, 323 (1964).
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jury. 2 3 ' The warranty of workmanlike performance, as a
vehicle for carrying out an implied promise to indemnify, is
suitable only when there is no apportionment of fault and
only one of several parties will be held liable for the entire
damage amount. When apportionment of fault is the rule, a
system of
comparative negligence is best suited to distribute
liability. 3 1
Tort law is a more appropriate system of fault allocation
and determination in situations involving conduct and actions
which cause injury than is a contract-based concept. As the
Supreme Court has recognized, Congress intended to nullify
the doctrines of both the Sieracki and the Ryan cases 2 2 by
adopting the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA. There is no
express indication that in extirpating the root Congress intended to take the branch as well. But in nullifying the effect
of Ryan in its original context as a vehicle for providing a
means of allowing full indemnification, the federal courts
should not now uphold it in peripheral contexts. The doctrine
of workmanlike performance was created for a specific purpose, and the vehicle giving rise to its existence having passed,
the entire superstructure should be razed by the courts.
Of course, there will be situations such as existed in Italia
Societa per Azionia di Naviagazione v. Oregon Stevedoring
Co.,2"' where a stevedore-employer might not be liable under a
standard of negligence but would be liable under the formerly
prevailing warranty of workmanlike performance. In Italia
Societa, a longshoreman was injured when a tent rope sup-

230. Id. at 324.
231. In McGuire v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 486 F. Supp. 1374 (E.D. Wis. 1980), the
court rejected the vessel's claim of a warranty of workmanlike performance entitling

it to full indemnity, stating that under section 905(b) of the LHWCA "liability among
the vessel, the injured longshoreman and other parties on the vessel, is apportioned
according to fault on a true comparative basis." Id. at 1381. See also Santos v.
Scindia Steam Nay. Co., 598 F.2d 480, 485, 489 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. granted sub
nom. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 100 S. Ct. 2150 (1980); Lopez v.
A/S D/S Svendorg, 581 F.2d 319, 322 (2d Cir. 1978); Wiles v. Delta S.S. Lines, Inc.,
574 F.2d 1338, 1339 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); Gay v. Ocean Transport & Trading,
Ltd., 564 F.2d 1233, 1238 (5th Cir. 1977); Pastorello v. Konin Klijke Nederl Stoomb
Maats, 456 F. Supp. 882, 886 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (all asserting comparative negligence
exists under the LHWCA amendments of 1972).
232. See, e.g., Bloomer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 100 S. Ct. 925, 930 (1980); Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 99 S. Ct. 2753, 2757 (1979).
233. 376 U.S. 315 (1964).
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plied by the stevedore-employer snapped while he was using
it. The district court specifically found that the stevedore was
not negligent in any respect, since the defective condition of
the rope was a latent defect. 2 4 But, as stated above, under the
Sieracki-Ryan doctrine either the vessel or the stevedore was
to be held fully liable; there could be no apportionment of liability. Under the circumstances, the Court felt that it would
be fairer to impose liability on the stevedore-employer even
though it was not negligent because, in comparison to the vessel, it was in a better condition to take "preventive measures
and thereby to reduce the likelihood of injury. 23 5 The injured
longshoreman, then, was allowed to recover. Under a system
of comparative negligence, where a standard of reasonable
care would be the only criterion for judging liability, the injured longshoreman in Italia Societa would not have been allowed recovery under the facts established. 3 6 Wherever negligence is the sole criterion for recovery, negligence must be
proven or recovery will be denied. It is not a valid objection to
the abolition of the warranty of workmanlike performance to
simply state that in cases where negligence cannot be proven
no one will be liable in tort for a longshoreman's or harbor
worker's injuries. The abolition of any warranty of workmanlike performance between any or all of the parties in this situation simply puts the maritime law in a position similar to
that prevailing in all industrial situations. There is nothing inherently unfair in such equality.
Retention of the warranty of workmanlike performance as
a vehicle for imposing full indemnity on a stevedore-employer
has been promoted in two contexts. First, is the context where
a third party against whom recovery is sought by an injured
longshoreman is not a vessel but is some other entity.237 In
those situations, the third party has argued that while the
right of a vessel to seek indemnification from a stevedore-em-

234. Id. at 317-18.
235. Id. at 324.
236. Id. at 321-22.
237. See, e.g., Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714, 721-22 (2d Cir. 1978);
Rindone v. Arya Nat'l Shipping Co., 1980 A.M.C. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Brkaric v. Star
Iron & Steel Co., 409 F. Supp. 516, 522-23 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Gould v. General Mills,
Inc., 411 F. Supp. 1181, 1183 (W.D.N.Y. 1976); Crutchfield v. Atlas Offshore Boat
Serv. Inc., 403 F. Supp. 920, 923 (E.D. La. 1975).
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ployer who has breached a warranty of workmanlike conduct
has been abolished, such has not been the effect between parties who are not vessels and who are not the employer. The
basis of this argument is that in being freed of the absolute
warranty of seaworthiness, vessels as a quid pro quo relinquished their right to full indemnification from a stevedoreemployer; however, no such quid pro quo was given by
nonvessel third parties since they were never subject in the
first place to the warranty of seaworthiness. 238 A similar argument is propounded in a second context. It is argued by vessel
owners that the only situation in which the warranty of workmanlike performance requiring full indemnification has been
abolished is that existing between a vessel and a stevedoreemployer or repairman-employer.2 9" The vessel owners argue
that there was no abolition of the warranty of workmanlike
performance in the context where a vessel is sued but the injury was caused in whole or in part by the fault of a stevedore
or repairman who is not the employer of the injured party.
Such was the case in McGuire v. Lykes Bros. Steamship
2 40
Co.,

where the shipowner contracted with a stevedore to

perform services and the stevedore, in turn, subcontracted
with another company to provide additional assistance. An
employee of the subcontractor was injured and sued the shipowner and the nonemploying stevedore-general contractor.
The shipowner sought full indemnification from both the general contractor-stevedore and an independent contractor-repairman aboard the vessel at the time of the accident on the
basis that each had breached the warranty of workmanlike
performance to the shipowner. The shipowner argued that the
warranty of workmanlike performance and the right to full indemnity still existed since Congress had meant to abolish
them only when the stevedore was the actual employer of the
injured longshoreman. The trial court rejected this argument
and applied the doctrine of comparative negligence. The shipowner's argument loses its force when considered in the context of a comparative negligence system. Under such a system,
238. See, e.g., Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714, 721-22 (2d Cir. 1978).
239. See, e.g., Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 474 F. Supp. 751,
756-57 (S.D.N.Y 1979); McGuire v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 486 F. Supp. 1374 (E.D. Wis.
1980) (argued for by vessel).
240. 486 F. Supp. 1374 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
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which allocates fault among all parties who are to blame and
allows contribution between and among joint tortfeasors, a
rule of implied full indemnification has no place whatsoever.
The argument for the retention of the warranty of workmanlike performance as the vehicle for allowing full indemnification ignores two facts. First, the imposition of a warranty of
workmanlike performance would be seldom, if ever, justified
unless predicated on the corollary doctrine of absolute liability under a warranty of seaworthiness. Without absolute liability under a doctrine such as the warranty of seaworthiness,
a concurrent doctrine imposing total liability on a stevedoreemployer has no justification. The doctrines of unseaworthiness and of indemnification were harmonized to impose liability on the party then thought to be best suited to minimize
the particular risk involved.241 Second, the admiralty concept
of comparative negligence is designed to promote the "more
equal distribution of justice, the dictates of humanity, the
safety of life and limb, and the public.

'242

Liability apportion-

ment according to fault is a workable system which distributes loss and liability to those responsibile according to their
degree of fault.
B.

Comparative Negligence

With the rules of Sieracki and Ryan removed from the
field of third party litigation under section 905(b) of the
LHWCA, the question remains concerning the precise form of
comparative negligence which should be applied under that
section. Federal court cases prior to 1972 applying the general
maritime law did not specifically identify the type of comparative negligence system which they were utilizing. Characteristically, the courts said that an injured longshoreman's or harbor worker's concurrent negligence did not bar recovery but
served only to reduce damages,243 or that in light of such negligence, the court would award damages as justice and equity
required. The question whether a plaintiff's negligence could
ever be so great as to go beyond the pale of justice and equity
241. See De Gioia v.-U.S. Lines Co., 304 F.2d 421, 426 (2d Cir. 1962).
242. The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1, 14 (1890).
243. See, e.g., Carter v. Brown, 212 F. 393, 395 (5th Cir. 1914); The Scandinavia,
156 F. 403, 406-07 (D. Me. 1907).
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and still not bar recovery was never directly addressed. No
answer is found in the text of section 905(b).
Although there are various forms of comparative negligence, only two are important to the present discussion. The
first of these is the so-called "pure" form of comparative negligence.244 Under this doctrine, a plaintiff is allowed
to recover reduced damages up to the point where it can be
said that his own conduct was the sole cause of his damage.
In other words, so long as the other party's negligent conduct was to any extent causal of the claimant's injury, the
claimant many recover his damages reduced only in proportion to the amount by 2 which
they were deemed due to his
45
own contributory fault.

Only where the plaintiff is found to be entirely to blame for
his own injuries is he then barred from recovery.
The second basic form of comparative negligence allows a
plaintiff recovery up to the point at which his negligence is
equal to or greater than that of the defendant. ' e Under this
variant, when a plaintiff's negligence is found to be greater
than that of the defendant, recovery is barred. When his own
negligence is only equal to or less than that of the defendant,
he may recover damages, which will be diminished according
to the amount of negligence attributed to him.
One commentator has stated: "Since 1890 it has been perfectly clear that pure comparative negligence . . . applies in

personal injury cases arising under maritime law. From that
time, admiralty courts have followed the practice of diminishing damages recovered to the extent of. . . [plaintiff's] contributory negligence. ' 247 A close look at the case law, though,

does not present conclusive support for this generalization.
Prior to 1972 federal courts rarely specified to what degree
they had found the plaintiff and defendant to be relatively
responsible for an injury. Therefore, it is difficult to determine
if instances existed in which recovery was allowed despite the
244. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr.
858 (1978); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).

245. Laufenberg, Comparative Negligence Primer 9 (Def. Research Instit., Inc.
1975) (footnote omitted).
246. See, e.g., N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (1979); Wis. STAT. § 895.045 (1977).
247. V. SCHWARTZ, Com ARTiw NEGLIGENCE § 3.3(B), at 57 (1974) (footnote
omitted).
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fact that a plaintiff might have been more negligent than a
2 48
defendant. In The Lackawanna,
a passenger brought a negligence action against a ferry boat for personal injuries. In deciding the case, the court found that the passenger's conduct
"constituted negligence on his part to a greater degree than
that of the ferry boat. 2 49 The court allowed the plaintiff onethird of his damages. In Guerrini v. United States,2 50 Judge
Learned Hand, writing for the court, remanded the case to the
district court for clarification of the facts, stating that "if the
judge supplies the finding we mentioned the faults will be in
the proportion of one to [three] and a decree will be entered
for one-fourth of the award which he made," 251 thereby apparently allowing a partial recovery even in the face of a finding
that the plaintiff was more negligent than the defendant. It is
difficult to find other similar examples.
A more fundamental reason exists for finding that the
form of comparative negligence to be applied under section
905(b) is pure comparative negligence. The "equal to or
greater than" rule simply lowers, but does not eliminate, the
bar of contributory negligence. As discussed above, 252 at least
since 1884 in negligence actions under the general maritime
law, the federal courts have eschewed the common-law rule
that contributory negligence bars recovery. The concept of
contributory negligence at any point totally barring recovery
by a plaintiff is foreign to the admiralty court. Therefore, a
modified system, such as the "equal to or greater than" form
of comparative negligence, which at a certain point bars recovery because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiff,
does not appear to be the one that should be embraced by the
federal courts in actions under section 905(b). The "equal to
or greater than" system simply shifts the rule of contributory
negligence to a lower level, leaving it in full effect in certain
instances. Pure comparative negligence should thus be utilized
by the courts in actions under the LHWCA.
Numerous federal court negligence decisions under section
905(b) have calculated numerical percentages for the plain248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

151 F. 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1907).
Id. at 501.
167 F.2d 352 (2d Cir. 1948).
Id. at 356.
See text accompanying notes 167-85 supra.
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tiff's and defendant's negligence in order to determine the
amount by which the plaintiff's damage award should be reduced.253 As one circuit court stated, "Under the admiralty
rule, the plaintiff's recovery is reduced in proportion to his
own fault .. . ."I" Such an objective method of calculating a
party's degree of negligence by a percentage or proportion has
support in cases decided prior to the adoption of the 1972
amendments. The Second Circuit in 1920 approved a district
court's jury charge which read as follows: "If the jury finds
that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, this need
not be a bar to a verdict in its favor .... [T]hey may take

that fact into account in reduction of damages, thereby reducing the recovery to an extent proportionatewith the extent
of plaintiff's fault. ' 255 In Stokes v. United States,2 5 a court

in the same circuit stated that it was inclined "to the belief
that, in such a case, division on a 30-70% basis is not erroneous.

2 57

Three years later, the court remanded a case stating

that if the plaintiff were found negligent, the district court
should "apportion the damages." 58 In Ahlgren v. Red Star
Towing & Transp. Co., 59 a district court jury had found the
plaintiff fifteen percent contributorily negligent and reduced
the damage award accordingly. On appeal, the defendant contended that the court should reduce the award by fifty percent. The court rejected the contention that a fifty percent
reduction rule should apply noting that "apportionment of
damages .. .on a comparative fault basis and without reliance on a statute . . .

was the proper method under tbe

general maritime law. The court added that the Supreme
Court in The Max Morris261 "said it left open the question of
253. See, e.g., Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 99 S. Ct. 2753

(1979); Griffith v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 610 F.2d 116 (3d Cir. 1979); Lawson v. United States, 605 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1979); Bachtel v. Mammoth Bulk Carriers, Ltd., 605 F.2d 438 (9th Cir. 1979); Smith v. Eastern Seaboard Pile Driving, Inc.,
604 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1979); Canizzo v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1978).
254. Lopez v. A/S D/S Svendborg, 581 F.2d 319, 322 (2d Cir. 1978) (emphasis
added).
255. Cricket S.S. Co. v. Parry, 263 F. 523, 526 (2d Cir. 1920) (emphasis added).
256. 144 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944).
257. Id. at 84.
258. Kreste v. United States, 158 F.2d 575, 580 (2d Cir. 1946).
259. 214 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1954).
260. Id. at 621.
261. 137 U.S. 1 (1890).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:349

apportionment of damages. Filling in this gap . . . we and
several other courts, in such personal injury maritime tort
cases, have applied the rule of comparative negligence. '26 2
The lower court's decision was affirmed because the court
found "apportionment in a personal-injury suit for a maritime
tort resting on negligence only"26 3 to be proper.
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the question of percentage apportionment of damages in personal injury actions. However, in Beadle v. Spencer,2 6 4 the Court
stated that contributory negligence under the maritime law
was the "ground only for apportionment of the damage
... .,,65 And the Supreme Court in Edmonds v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique'66 considered a case in which the
district court had found the plaintiff ten percent negligent,
and two other parties seventy percent and twenty percent responsible for the plaintiff's injuries. The Court did not comment on the district court's apportionment on the basis of
percentage amounts.
Percentage apportionment can sometimes result in ridiculously finite calculations. For example, in one case2 67 a shipowner was found liable for 22.2222 percent and a salvor for
77.7778 percent of the damage resulting from an explosion
during salvage operations on a vessel which had previously
been involved in a marine fire. Nonetheless, it appears to be
the most efficient means for apportioning liability among the
parties in actions under section 905(b).
Likewise, in Edmonds, the Supreme Court stated that
Congress in using the term "comparative negligence . . .alluded only, and not erroneously.. . to the comparative negligence of the plaintiff longshoreman and the defendant shipowner a concept that ... was well established in
'
2 68
admiralty.
It would not be a fair reading, however, to interpret this statement as meaning that only the negligence of
the plaintiff and a single defendant may be apportioned in an

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

214 F.2d 618, 621 (2d Cir. 1954).
Id. at 622.
298 U.S. 124 (1936).
Id. at 131.
99 S. Ct. 2753 (1979).
In re M/T Alva Cape, 616 F.2d 605, 611 (2d Cir. 1980).
99 S. Ct. at 2760-61 n.23 (emphasis added).
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action under section 905(b). Rather, it would be proper to apportion negligence among all the parties alleged to be causally
negligent for an injury. This was the law applied by Chief
Judge Reynolds in McGuire v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co.,28 "
in which the negligence of the plaintiff and four other parties
was apportioned.
When liability is apportioned according to the relative degree of fault of the various parties, attempts by one party to
shift the entire burden of liability to another on the basis of
an indemnification theory are wholly inappropriate. In Doca
v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A.,27 1 one negligent defendant sought full indemnification from another negligent
defendant on the basis of an alleged breach of a warranty of
workmanlike performance. The district court found that full
indemnity under the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA was
"open to question, ' 27 2 but avoided resolving the issue since it

269. 486 F. Supp. 1374 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
270. And this computation should include the alleged causal negligence of all
"phantom," settling, immune, or nonjoined persons as well. This was the procedure
employed by Chief Judge Reynolds in McGuire v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 486 F. Supp.
1374 (E.D. Wis. 1980) and that specifically deemed "logically essential" by the California Supreme Court in American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d
578, 589 n.2, 578 P.2d 899, 906 n.2, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 189 n.2 (1978). The California
court approved the following jury instruction in that case:
REDUCTION OF DAMAGES BECAUSE OF CONTRImUTORY NEGLIGENCE

If you find that plaintiff's injury was proximately caused by a combination
of negligence of [one or more of] the defendant[s] and contributory negligence
of the plaintiff, you will determine the amount of damages to be awarded by
you, as follows:
First. You will determine the total amount of damages to which the plaintiff would be entitled under the court's instructions if plaintiff had not been
contributorily negligent.
Second: You will determine what proportion or percentage is attributable
to the plaintiff of the total combined negligence of the plaintiff and of the
defendant[s] [and of all other persons] whose negligence proximately contributed to the injury.
Third: You will then reduce the total amount of plaintiff's damages by the
proportion or percentage of negligence attributable to the plaintiff.
BAJI No. 14.90 at 642-43 (6th ed. 1977). See also Gustavson v. O'Brien, 87 Wis. 2d
193, 207, 274 N.W.2d 627, 634 (1979); Connar v. West Shore Equip., Inc., 68 Wis. 2d
42, 227 N.W.2d 660 (1975); McCraw v. Witynski, 43 Wis. 2d 313, 322, 168 N.W.2d
537, 540 (1969); Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d 182, 192, 124 N.W.2d 106, 111-12
(1963); contra, Leger v. Drilling Well Control, Inc., 69 F.R.D. 358, 363 (W.D. La.
1976), af'd, 592 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1979).
271. 474 F. Supp. 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
272. Id. at 756.
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found that there had been no breach of any warranty of workmanlike performance even if one did, in fact, exist.27 3 A similar contention was put forward in the McGuire274 case by the
shipowner defendant, but the court specifically rejected any
theory of indemnity. It held, instead, that under the 1972
amendments "liability among the vessel, the injured longshoreman and other parties on the vessel, is apportioned according to fault on a true comparative basis ' 275 and, as such, a
percentage apportionment of liability and not indemnity was
the rule. This appears to be the better rule in cases under section 905(b) and should be the one uniformly adopted by the
lower courts in such actions.
C. Liability Apportionment Among Joint Tortfeasors
Once liability has been apportioned between two or more
defendants on the basis of a comparison of the amount of
their responsibility for any injuries, the question of liability
for payment of damages must be resolved. It is apparent that
the concept of joint and several liability in the context of concurrent tortfeasors is the rule under the comparative negligence system in actions brought under the LHWCA against
negligent third parties. 27 6 The rule of joint and several liabil-

ity provides that a tortfeasor is liable for any injury for which
his negligence is a proximate cause.27 When the independent
negligent actions of a number of tortfeasors are the concurrent proximate cause of a single injury, each tortfeasor is personally liable for the entire amount of damage sustained. The
injured person may sue any one, several or all of the
tortfeasors to obtain a recovery for his injuries. The mere fact
that under a system of comparative negligence it is possible to
assign some specific percentage figure to the relative responsibility of each defendant does not detract from the rule that
each defendant's negligence is a proximate cause of the entire
indivisible injury to a plaintiff. Under the joint and several
liability concept, an injured employee suing negligent third
273.
274.
275.
276.

Id.
McGuire v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 486 F. Supp. 1374 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
Id. at 1381.
See, e.g., Griffith v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 610 F.2d 116, 130 (3d

Cir. 1979).
277. See 74 Am. JuR. 2d Torts § 73 (1974).
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parties is not deprived of his right of recovery because one or
more of the joint tortfeasors is financially unable to satisfy his
proportioned share of the damages.
Contribution is the process by which the joint tortfeasors
apportion liability among themselves.278 Contribution arises
when a joint tortfeasor has paid more than his fair share or
burden of a common liability. It requires that a negligent
wrongdoer, whose liability towards another is concurrent and
common with at least one other tortfeasor, must have paid
27
more than his proportionate share of the common liability.

9

The Supreme Court in Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz
Kopke, Inc.,280 recognized the right of contribution between
joint tortfeasors in noncollision cases under the maritime law.
The Court stated that "a more equal distribution of justice
can best be achieved by ameliorating the common-law rule
against contribution which permits a plaintiff to force one or
two wrongdoers to bear the entire loss, though the other may
have been equally or more to blame.

' 28 1

The Court, however,

left open the question of whether contribution "should be
based on an equal division of damages or should be relatively
apportioned in accordance with the degree of fault of the
parties.

2' 8 2

One year later, in a collision cage 283 which involved only

two parties so that it did not touch on the question of contribution per se, the Court provided some guidance.
We hold that when two or more parties have contributed by
their fault to cause property damage in a maritime collision
...
, liability for such damage is to be allocated among the
parties proportionately to the comparative degree of their

278. See 18 Am. Jun. 2d Contribution § 1 (1965).
279. Id.
280. 417 U.S. 106 (1974). One commentator states that a right of contribution

existed unimpaired in the general maritime law from at least 1875 until 1952, when
the Court decided Halcyon Lines v. Haern Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S.
282 (1952), casting doubt upon the validity of the rule. See Staring, Contributionand
Division of Damages in Admiralty and Maritime Cases, 45 CAL. L. REv. 304, 304 &

n.1 (1957) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Erie & W. Transp. Co., 204 U.S. 220 (1907))
(Holmes, J.); Barbarino v. Stanhope S.S. Co., 151 F.2d 553, 555 (2d Cir. 1945) (L.
Hand, J.) (both property cases).

281. 417 U.S. 106, 111 (1974).
282. Id. at 108 n.3.
283. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
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fault, and that liability for such damage is to be allocated
equally only when the parties are equally at fault or when it
is not possible fairly to measure the comparative degree of
their fault.2
Thus, it seems clear that contribution should also be based on
the relative degree of fault of each party causing a particular
injury to a longshoreman or harbor worker.2 8 5 Allocation of liability based on the percentage of causal negligence attributable to each joint tortfeasor is far more equitable and just than
allocation equally between them. If liability between a single
plaintiff and a single defendant can be allocated on the basis
of the percentage of fault attributable to each, the same can
be done for contribution purposes among all of the joint
tortfeasors. A Wisconsin state court, considering the question
of allocation of liability for contribution purposes between
joint tortfeasors, stated, "[T]here is no reason in logic or in
natural justice why the shares of common liablity of joint
tortfeasors should not be translated into the percentage of the
causal negligence which contributed to the injury. '286 Moreover, the determination and enforcement of rights of contribution between joint tortfeasors can easily be accommodated in
the same proceeding which resolves the underlying damage
claim between the plaintiff and any named defendants. 8 7
Complications occur, however, when one or more of the
joint tortfeasors has made a settlement with the plaintiff and
is thus not a party to the action. Such a settlement can occur
through the use of one of several mechanisms. The first is a
covenant not to sue. This covenant is a contract and is construed as being between the plaintiff and a third party. 28 8 In
consideration of a payment or other thing of value, the plaintiff agrees not to bring suit against the third party, who is
then insulated from further liability. A covenant not to sue,

284. Id. at 411 (emphasis added).
285. See Griffith v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 610 F.2d 116, 129-30 (3d Cir.
1979). See also V. SCHWARTZ, CoMPARATwE NEGLIGENCE § 16.7, at 99 (Supp. 1978).
286. Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 9, 114 N.W.2d 105, 109 (1962).
287. See, e.g., Johnson v. Heintz, 73 Wis. 2d 286, 295, 243 N.W.2d 815, 822-23
(1976); Wagner v. Daye, 68 Wis. 2d 123, 125-26, 227 N.W.2d 688, 689 (1975); Gies v.
Nissen Corp., 57 Wis. 2d 371, 377, 204 N.W.2d 519, 522 (1973); Michel v. McKenna,
199 Wis. 608, 614-15, 227 N.W. 396, 399 (1929).
288. 66 AM. JurL 2d Release § 2 (1973).
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however, does not release or extinguish any of the plaintiff's
cause of action against the joint tortfeasors. 28 9 It is merely a
contract between the plaintiff and a third party, not affecting
the rights of those not parties to it. Consequently, if, at trial,
the settling joint tortfeasor is found liable for a certain percentage of causal negligence, the nonsettling tortfeasor,
against whom a damage award has been recovered, might have
a right of contribution against the settling tortfeasor. For example, let us suppose that at trial there were a damage award
of $100,000, the nonsettling tortfeasor was found sixty percent
negligent, and the settling tortfeasor was found forty percent
negligent. Pursuant to the rule of joint and several liability,
the nonsettling tortfeasor would be entitled to credit as a reduction against the $100,000 damage award only the specific
dollar amount paid by the settling tortfeasor to the plaintiff.
Unless the settling tortfeasor had made a payment of at least
$40,000 to the plaintiff, the nonsettling tortfeasor would have
a right of contribution against the settling tortfeasor. If the
settling tortfeasor had paid the plaintiff only $20,000 for the
covenant not to sue, the nonsettling tortfeasor would be liable
to the plaintiff for $80,000. However, this would be more than
his fair share of the common liability, i.e., $60,000. Hence, he
would have a right of contribution for $20,000 against the settling tortfeasor. Even though the settling tortfeasor had
"bought his peace" with the plaintiff, he has not thereby immunized himself from the contribution rights of a nonsettling
joint tortfeasor.
A second and distinct settlement mechanism has been devised for use under a tort system of comparative negligence
whereby a third party, wishing to settle prior to trial with a
plaintiff, may do so and at the same time immunize himself
from the contribution rights of nonsettling joint tortfeasors.
This is accomplished by means of a release of (and indemnification for) that part of the cause of action for which the settling tortfeasor might be liable at trial.2 90 A release usually
represents an abandonment or relinquishment of a claim or
291
right to the person against whom the claim or right exists.

289. Id.
290. See Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106 (1963).
291. 66 AM. JUR. 2d Release §§ 1 and 2 (1973).
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A release discharges the claim or obligation.2 2 A plaintiff executing a release cannot sue a settling tortfeasor, and also forfeits that part of the cause of action which he has settled. In
the case of Pierringer v. Hoger,29 3 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court approved a release which it found to be effective under
a system of comparative negligence and contribution apportioned according to relative fault. In that case, each release
provided that the plaintiff
does hereby credit and satisfy that portion of the total
amount of damages of the undersigned... which has been
caused by the negligence, if any, of such of the settling parties hereto as may hereafter be determined to be the case in
the further trial or other disposition of this or any other action, it being the act and intention of the undersigned to
release and discharge, and he does hereby release and discharge that fraction and portion and percentage of his total
causes of action and claim for damages against all parties
...which shall hereafter, by the further trial or other disposition of this or any other action, be determined to be the
sum of the portions or fractions or percentages of causal
negligence for which any or all of the settling parties hereto
are found to be liable .... 29
The effect of such a percentage release under a system of
comparative negligence is to discharge the plaintiff's claim to
the extent of the percentage determined at trial to which the
settling tortfeasor is liable for the plaintiff's injuries. Under
the percentage release, if a plaintiff settles prior to trial with a
tortfeasor who at trial is found to be twenty percent liable for
the plaintiff's injuries, then the release will discharge twenty
percent of the plaintiff's cause of action, regardless of the
amount of consideration given by that settling tortfeasor to
the plaintiff. The payment made in consideration for obtaining the release is the settling tortfeasor's fair proportion of
the common liability which he shared with the other joint
tortfeasors. This being so, a nonsettling tortfeasor may not
claim any right of contribution against a tortfeasor who obtains a percentage release from the plaintiff. For example, let
292.
293.
294.
(release

Id.
21 Wis. 2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106 (1963).
McComas, Tort Releases in Wisconsin, 49 MARQ. L.
form reprinted).

REV.

533, 541 (1966)
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us assume that the damages are $100,000, and a joint
tortfeasor settles before trial for $5,000. He is then found at
trial to be twenty percent causally negligent while a nonsettling tortfeasor is found eighty percent causally negligent. As
a result of the release, the nonsettling tortfeasor may claim no
right of contribution against the settling tortfeasor even
though the settling tortfeasor's fair share, if he had not settled, would have been $20,000. This is so because the nonsettling tortfeasor is not thereby required to pay any more than
his fair share of the common liability. Since he is eighty percent liable for the damages, he must pay only $80,000. He will
not be liable for the $15,000 which the plaintiff might have
gotten by not settling with the other joint tortfeasor. The
plaintiff is not allowed to recover this $15,000 deficit because
he has settled and released twenty percent of his claim in its
entirety for $5,000. The nonsettling tortfeasor will not be
heard to complain because he, in fact, has paid no more than
his fair share of the common liability. It is none of his concern
that a settling tortfeasor has made a better bargain than he by
settling than by going to trial.
In the system of comparative negligence existing under
section 905(b) of the LHWCA, such a settlement mechanism
would encourage early settlement since a settling party could
assure itself that it would not be joined in any further action
and that it would not be liable for contribution to a nonsettling tortfeasor against whom a judgment is gained by an injured longshoreman. The percentage release, approved by the
Wisconsin court, would have this effect. Its use should be encouraged by federal courts handling personal injury suits by
longshoremen against negligent third parties. One commentator described this percentage type release, as follows:
Claimants will be able to make settlements with the settling
parties in those instances where agreement can be reached
between them and still retain their pro rata claims and
causes of action against non-settling joint tort-feasors to the
extent of the ultimately determined proportionate liability
of the non-settling defendants. Non-settling defendants will
be protected in that they will benefit from a pro tanto reduction in the recoverable damages allocable to the conduct
of settling parties, and will only be responsible for the damages attributable to their own proportionate liability in the
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In light of the Supreme Court's recognition of a right to contribution between joint tortfeasors in noncollision cases, its
strong inclination, as shown in United States v. Reliable
Transfer Co. 9 ' to favor the allocation of damages based on
relative fault, and the general policy of the law to encourage
early settlement, the federal courts should encourage the use
of such percentage releases in maritime, personal injury,
third-party actions.
D. Damage Apportionment Among Joint Tortfeasors
Since the Supreme Court's 1946 decision in Sieracki, the
courts increasingly have had to struggle with the problems of
damage allocation in longshore personal injury cases. This
struggle has had a checkered history, moving first from extreme to extreme; a fair and equitable allocation of liability
satisfactory to all still has not been established. In the aftermath of the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA and the concomitant general demise of the Sieracki-Ryan seaworthiness
- indemnity cycle of liability, employers and third-party
tortfeasors have been vying in an effort to allocate the economic burden imposed by a damage award apportioned under
the comparative negligence system established by Congress.
Such a conflict between the various groups - owners, stevedores, liability underwriters and compensation carriers - has
resulted in a highlighting of the conflict between three distinct but related "loss-allocating mechanisms. 291 7 One is the
tort-based concept of contribution between joint tortfeasors,
as discussed above. Another, is the non-tort, absolute liability
concept of workers' compensation.2 9 8 The third is the equitable concept of a lien credit.2 9 The interrelation of these three
295. Id. at 539.
296. 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
297. Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 99 S. Ct. 2753, 2757
(1979).
298. See generally 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 65 to
65.10 (1976).
299. See Coleman & Daly, Equitable Credit:Apportionment of Damages According to Fault in TripartiteLitigation Under the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 35 MARYLAND L. REV. 351 (1976);
Cohen & Dougherty, The 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act: An Opportunity for Equitable Uniformity in Tripar-
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principles has never been satisfactorily harmonized by the
courts. The current status of the law simply replaces one unfairness with another; the ill-fated Sieracki-Ryan combination
has merely been replaced by the courts with an equally arbitrary system of inequitable loss apportionment. The interplay
of the compensation system with an employee's cause of action in tort against a negligent third party has left third-party
tortfeasors jointly and severally liable for the whole of any
damage award made to an injured employee, while allowing a
negligent employer to escape any liability whatsoever, even
the absolute liability imposed by the workers' compensation
system.3 00 The "obstinate cleaving"3 01 by the courts to such a
system of loss allocation has created a status quo unsupported
by equitable principles and congressional intent, real or
imagined. The words of the Supreme Court in a related context are appropriate in maintaining that the status quo "has
continued to prevail. . . by sheer inertia rather than by reason of any intrinsic merit."30 2 After discussing the origins of
this inequitable situation, the authors will suggest a system of
allocation under section 905(b) of the LHWCA wholly consistent with the spirit and purpose of the Act and unopposed to
precedent established thereunder.3 0 3
As discussed above, 304 the Supreme Court has allowed contribution between joint tortfeasors in maritime personal injury
cases since the Cooper Stevedoring30 5 case in 1974. Contribution was established in the maritime personal injury area by
the Court in order to achieve a "more equal distribution of
justice."308 Notably, however, in Cooper Stevedoring, none of
the joint tortfeasor defendants was subject to the LHWCA in
tite Industrial Accident Litigation, 19 N.Y.L.F. 587 (1974).
300. See Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 99 S. Ct. 2753 (1979).
301. A phrase used by Judge Learned Hand in regard to the former rule of divided damages in collision cases. National Bulk Carriers v. United States, 183 F.2d
405, 410 (2d Cir. 1950) (L. Hand, J., dissenting).
302. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 410 (1975) (abolishing
the 1855 rule of equal division of damages in collision cases).
303. See Bloomer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 100 S. Ct. 925 (1980); Edmonds v.
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 99 S. Ct. 2753 (1979).
304. See text accompanying note 280 supra.
305. 417 U.S. 106 (1974).
306. Id. at 111 (1974) (quoting The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1, 14 (1890)).
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regard to the injured longshoreman.30 7 Thus, there were no
"countervailing considerations"3 0 8 posed by the LHWCA
which would interfere with the allowance of contribution between the wrongdoers. However, when one of the wrongdoers
happens to be the employer of the injured longshoreman and
subject to the compensation scheme, a different result has
evolved as to the allowance of contribution between the various wrongdoers.
Discussion in this area must begin with Halcyon Lines v.
Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp.,30 9 where the Court
first considered the existence of a right of contribution against
a negligent employer subject to the LHWCA. In that case the
stevedore-employer was found to be seventy-five percent negligent and the shipowner twenty-five percent negligent. The
Court initially asserted that it had the power to work out
rules of contribution between a negligent employer and a negligent third party and would do so if "wholly convinced that it
would best serve the ends of justice." 10 Under these circumstances, however, the Court felt that "it would be unwise to
attempt to fashion new judicial rules of contribution"3 1 ' and
deferred the question to congressional action. The Court
stated that "because Congress while acting in the field has
stopped short of approving the rule of contribution here
urged, we think it would be inappropriate for us to do so."'"
It would be better for Congress to legislate in the area, the
Court concluded, since the "record before us is silent as to the
wishes of employees, carriers and shippers .... "s.s In a footnote to the decision,1 4 the Court specifically found it unnecessary to decide whether or not section 905 of the LHWCA foreclosed contribution between a negligent employer and a thirdparty tortfeasor.
One year later in Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn,1 5 the
307. The defendants were the owner and time charterer of the vessel on which the
plaintiff was injured.
308. 417 U.S. at 106, 113 (1974).
309. 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
310. Id. at 285.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 287.
313. Id. at 286.
314. Id. at 286 n.12.
315. 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
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Court again encountered the question of loss allocation between an employer and a third party. The district court had
found both the employer and the shipowner to be negligent
and that the longshoreman himself had been seventeen and
one-half percent causally negligent of his own injuries.31 0 The
district court reduced the damage award by the seventeen and
one-half percent amount and entered a contribution order in
favor of the shipowner.31 7 The court of appeals reversed the
judgment of contribution 8s and the Supreme Court affirmed
on the basis of its holding in Halcyon. The Court stated that
in Halcyon, "We held that contribution could not be exacted
under circumstances like those here involved.

31 9

This situation remained until the Court's decision in 1956
in Ryan,3 20 which, significantly, did not turn on the subject of
contribution between mutual wrongdoers. Instead, as discussed above, 21 it centered on the contractual principle of a
warranty of workmanlike performance which was held to be
implied in every service agreement between a stevedore and a
shipowner. If a breach of that warranty contributed to the injury of a longshoreman, a shipowner was entitled to full indemnity from the breaching stevedore. Since shipowners had
the right of full indemnification in almost every instance
where a longshoreman was injured by the concurrent fault of
both the shipowner and the stevedore-employer, the question
of contribution between the employer and a negligent third
party was of little importance, until Congress acted in 1972.22
Congress' nullification of the Ryan decision in the context of
mutual fault between a stevedore and a shipowner again
shifted attention to the question of contribution between a
323
negligent employer and a negligent third party.
When the Supreme Court in 1974 in Cooper Stevedoring32
held that contribution was allowable between joint tortfeasors,
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

Hawn v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 226 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
Id. at 232.
Hawn v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 198 F.2d 800 (3d Cir. 1952).
346 U.S. 406, 408 (1953).
Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
See text accompanying notes 207-30 supra.
See note 1 supra.
See cases listed in note 338 infra.
417 U.S. 106 (1974).
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it specifically stated that the "factors underlying our decision
in Halcyon still have much force." 32 5 Although the question of
the negligence of the employer was not actually before the
Court in that case, the implication of the reaffirmation of the
underlying rationale in Halcyon was that contribution per se
was not allowable between a negligent employer and a negligent third party. Presumably, this was because a stevedoreemployer's exclusive liability was to the injured employee in
the form of compensation benefits. In spite of this, the lower
courts, in handling longshore personal injury cases, devised
several formulas for allocating damage liability between a negligent employer and other third parties which were thought
not to be in contravention of Cooper Stevedoring.
In developing any loss-allocation system, the lower courts
had to keep in mind two factors. The first was the provison of
section 905 making compensation benefit payments the exclusive liability of an employer in relation to its employee. 26
This much had been stated by the Court in Ryan:
The obvious purpose of this provision [section 905] is to
make the statutory liability of an employer to contribute to
its employee's compensation the exclusive liability of such
employer to its employee, or to anyone claiming under or
through such employee, on account of his injury or death
32 7
arising out of that employment.
And, in Cooper Stevedoring,828 the Court re-emphasized the
exclusivity of section 905 by stating, "Indeed, the 1972
amendments to the Harbor Workers' Act re-emphasize Congress' determination that as between an employer and its injured employee, the right to compensation under the Act
should be the employees' exclusive remedy. '329 A second factor was the congressional addition to section 905 of a provision stating that "the employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly . ...
330
In evaluating the viability of the various loss-allocation
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

Id. at 112.
See 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (1976).
Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 129 (1956).
417 U.S. 106 (1974).
Id. at 112-13.
33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976).
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schemes worked out by the lower courts, one must keep in
mind the underlying rationale of a workers' compensation system. 31 Workers' compensation is not based upon principles of
tort law. Under a compensation act, the theory of negligence
as the basis of liability is abolished, and, in general, a right to
compensation is given for all injuries incident to the employment relationship.332 The employee forfeits a tort-based right
to seek an uncertain but possibly larger recovery from his employer and is given in its place a recovery which is absolute in
its payment and definite in its sum. The theory of a compensation act is that it provides a remedy for the employee which
is both expeditious and independent of proof of fault, and imposes on an employer a liability which is limited and determinate. The amount of the compensation liability is generally
determined in accordance with a definite schedule, 333 based
upon the loss of earning power, the usual provision being for
the payment of a specified amount at regular intervals over a
definite period. The payments, unless contested by the employer, begin almost immediately after a work-related injury
occurs. Hence, there is no delay, as there would be in a court
proceeding, before an employee begins to receive a recovery.
Most workers' compensation schemes do not abolish all of an
employee's causes of action in tort, preserving for him an action against a negligent third party, but not his employer.'
The LHWCA embodies all of these basic principles of
workers' compensation law. The LHWCA has prohibited direct actions by longshoremen against their employers since it
was enacted in 1927,135 but it has retained a right for an injured employee to sue a negligent third party.3 38 As is true of
most compensation statutes, the LHWCA does not require an
employee to elect between absolute compensation benefits and
a right of action against a negligent third party. 3 7 He may
331. See generally 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKAEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 1 & 2
(1978).
332. Id. § 2, at 5.
333. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 906 (1976).
334. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 933(a) (1976). See also Weisgall, Product Liability in
the Workplace: The Effect of Workers' Compensation on the Rights and Liabilities
of Third Parties, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 1035, 1082-88.
335. Ch. 509, § 5, 44 Stat. 1426 (1927).
336. Ch. 509, § 33(a), 44 Stat. 1440 (1927) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 933(a) (1976)).
337. Id.
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seek both, and it is in just such situations that the courts have
been forced to harmonize the differing liabilities of employers
who are covered by the LHWCA and concurrently negligent
third parties who are not.
The first loss-allocation scheme urged upon the lower
courts 38 in longshore personal injury cases under the
LHWCA was developed in Murray v. United States,33 9 a circuit court case litigated under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act,3' 0 which, like the LHWCA, precluded a suit
against an employer by an injured employee. In denying the
third-party tortfeasor a right to sue the employer for a contribution, the court stated:
Any inequity residing in the denial of contribution against
the employer is mitigated if not eliminated by our rule...
that where one joint tortfeasor causing injury compromises
the claim, the other tortfeasor, though unable to obtain contribution because the settling tortfeasor had "bought his
peace," is nonetheless protected by having his tort judgment
reduced by one-half, on the theory that one-half of the claim
was sold by the victim when he executed the settlement ....

The tortfeasor jointly responsible with an em-

ployer is not compelled to pay the total common law damages. The common law recovery of the injured employee is
thus reduced in consequence of the employee's compensation act, but that act gave him assurance of compensation
even in the absence of fault.3 1
Under the so-called Murray Credit, a third-party tortfeasor
who was jointly at fault with the employer was not forced to
pay the entire damage award; due to the injured employee's
recovery under the compensation act, the damage award was
reduced by one-half. The Murray Credit met with little success in courts litigating claims under the LHWCA. 2
338. See Frasca v. Prudential Grace Lines, Inc., 1975 A.M.C. 1143 (D. Md. 1975);
Shellman v. United States Lines Operators, Inc., 1975 A.M.C. 362 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
339. 405 F.2d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
340. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8150 (1968).
341. 405 F.2d 1361, 1365-66 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
342. See, e.g., Dodge v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K.K. Tokyo, 529 F.2d 669 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Hubbard v. Great Pac. Shipping Co., Monrovia, 404 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Ore. 1975); Crowshaw v. Koninklijke Nedlloyd, B.V. Rijswijk, 398 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Ore. 1975); Frasca v. Prudential Grace Lines, Inc., 1975
A.M.C. 1143 (D. Md. 1975); Shellman v. United States Lines Operators, Inc., 1975
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Shellman v. United States Lines Operators, Inc.343 high-

lighted the limited equitable application of that particular
scheme and rejected the Murray Credit "because it works only
when (1) the negligence of the employer is 50%, and, (2) the
compensation act recovery is 50% of what a judge or jury
finds to be the actual damage suffered by the employee, and
(3) no lien is allowed to an offending employer.

3

44

Other

courts followed the Shellman court's
lead and likewise re3

jected the Murray Credit doctrine. 4

The Shellman court, however, did adopt a different lossallocation scheme.3 ' In considering plaintiff's motion to strike
the allegations in the answer setting forth the Murray Credit
doctrine and a similar motion filed by the stevedore's subrogated compensation insurer to strike the allegations of contributory negligence, the court stated that in "[c]onsidering
the precedents, the statute and its legislative history, some order may be made out of the position of the competing interests in this litigation."
The court went on to hold that in a
negligence suit, the shipowner may claim the contributory
negligence of both the injured longshoreman and the stevedore-employer in reduction of any damages resulting from
some negligence on the part of the shipowner.3 48 Under this
scheme, an injured longshoreman's potential recovery was to
be reduced not only by the percentage of his attributed negligence, but also by the percentage of negligence attributed to
his employer. A subsequent district court 349 adopted the same
rationale, labeling it an "equitable credit"350 doctrine which
meant that a credit to the shipowner was allowed on the total
damages assessed in the same percentage as the court or jury
found the stevedore-employer to have contributed to the
plaintiff's injury. The equitable credit doctrine was specifically overruled in the Shellman case on appeals 1 and rejected
A.M.C. 362 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (all rejecting Murray doctrine).
343. 1975 A.M.C. 362 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
344. Id. at 368.
345. See cases in note 342 supra.
346. 1975 A.M.C. 362, 369-70 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
347. Id. at 369.
348. Id. at 369-70.
349. Frasca v. Prudential Grace Lines, Inc., 1975 A.M.C. 1143 (D. Md. 1975).
350. Id. at 1144.
351. Shellman v. United States Lines, Inc., 528 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1975).
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by subsequent courts considering the issue.3 52 The primary
objection to the equitable credit doctrine was that it had the
effect of imposing "unjustified burdens upon the injured longshoreman

35

3

by reducing his recovery by the amount of

causal negligence attributed to his stevedore-employer. The
courts found this unfair because "the injured plaintiff is entitled to recover the full amount of his damages. 3 54 As one
court noted:
To permit the employer's negligence to reduce the joint
tortfeasor vessel's liability would reduce the award of plaintiff, the one person who is blameless [in this case]. The innocent victim of concurrent negligence would find that,
through some judicial attempt to achieve equity for other
parties, he must accept a partial loaf of joint and several
55
liability.

3 56
In Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,
the Fourth Circuit instituted the equitable credit doctrine in
the form of a proportionate fault rule. A majority of an en
banc panel of the court concluded that the shipowner could be
required to pay no more than the proportion of causal negligence attributed to him.

From the longshoreman's point of view, this is not a harsh
result. He is protected by a system of compensation payable
to him, regardless of fault, and in amounts much larger than
were provided prior to 1972. He has a right of action against
the ship for damages to the extent that negligence of the
ship contributed to his injury. Our holding is only that he
may not recover from the ship damages attributable to the
neglect or actions of his fellow longshoremen or others than
3 57
the ship's crew.

352. See, e.g., Samuels v. Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, 573 F.2d 884
(5th Cir. 1978); Dodge v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K.K. Tokyo, 528 F.2d 669 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Darwin v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 501
(N.D. Cal. 1977); Hubbard v. Great Pac. Shipping Co., Monrovia, 404 F. Supp. 1242
(D. Ore. 1975).
353. Dodge v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K.K. Tokyo, 528 F.2d 669, 672 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
354. Sheilman v. United States Lines, Inc., 528 F.2d 675, 679 (9th Cir. 1975).
355. Samuels v. Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, 573 F.2d 884, 889 (5th
Cir. 1978).
356. 577 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1978).
357. Id. at 1156.
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In that case, the district court had found the plaintiff ten percent at fault, the ship twenty percent at fault and the stevedore-employer seventy percent at fault.358 The ship was thus
required to pay only twenty percent of the damage award. 5'
The Supreme Court reversed.3 60
V. TREATMENT
A. Requirements
Several implicit elements are involved whenever a court
attempts to fashion a loss-allocation scheme which straddles
the area between a tort-based fault system and a system of
absolute, no-fault liability. All of the above-mentioned apportionment systems have sought an apportionment of fault
based on the comparative negligence system imposed by Congress in the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA. The shipowners have been attempting to spread the loss as far as possible
according to fault. This, of course, brings about an equity of
liability based on an objective, easily ascertainable standard.
In addition, it further effectuates the congressional intent in
favor of a system of comparative fault over absolute tort liability of an individual party. Some courts have structured
loss-allocation mechanisms on the inherent fairness involved
in a comparative fault system. On the other hand, too little
attention has been paid to the impact of these loss-allocation
schemes on the injured longshoreman." 1 In seeking fairness in
allocation, the courts have often let the burden of that allocation fall upon the injured employee. In this regard, the maintenance of the integrity of the workers' compensation system
has not been observed. A compensation system imposes an absolute liability of payment on an employer but at a fixed and
determinate rate. Beyond this determined level, an employer
should not be forced to pay. Any system of contribution between a negligent employer and a third-party tortfeasor,
which requires an employer to contribute to any damage
358. Id. at 1154.
359. Id.
360. 99 S. Ct. 2753 (1979).
361. See the remark of Judge Friendly in Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d
714, 725 (2d Cir. 1978), "[O]ne is still
left to wonder why the longshoreman injured
by the negligence of a third party should recover less when his employer has also
been negligent than when the employer has been without fault."
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award an amount in excess of compensation liability, does not
adhere to the principle that a compensation system should
limit an employer's liability to a determined amount.
Any acceptable system of loss-allocation in this area must
strike a proper balance between the law-making power of
Congress as evidenced in the LHWCA and the ability of the
federal courts to interpret the law, weigh the equities within
any given situation and reach a decision. The authors propose
that a fair and equitable balance among all of the parties may
be based upon the following five propositions:
1. An employee injured in the course of his employment
should recover workers' compensation benefits from his employer, regardless of fault.
2. An injured employee's third-party tort recovery should
be diminished by no one's causal negligence but his own.
3. An injured employee should not be allowed the double
recovery of compensation benefits and a larger third-party recovery for the same injury.
4. Causal fault should be apportioned as far as possible
on a true comparative basis among all wrongdoers, whether
parties to the action or not, regardless of immunity.
5. A causally negligent employer should be liable to an
injured employee only to the extent of its workers' compensation liability.
Proper application of these propositions to an injured (or deceased) longshoreman-shipowner-stevedore-third party situation will result in an equitable lien credit solution to balance
the law and the equities between all of the parties.
The viability of any system based on the five propositions
set forth above must first be evaluated against the Supreme
Court's decision in Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Trans3 2
atlantique
and the provisions of the LHWCA. In Edmonds,
the circuit court had held that under the 1972 amendments to
the LHWCA, the shipowner was liable only for that share of
the total damages equivalent to the ratio of its fault to the
total fault.3 63 The Supreme Court premised its decision reversing the circuit court on two basic grounds. The first was
that Congress, in enacting the 1972 amendments, had shown

362. 99 S. Ct. 2753 (1979).
363. 577 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1978).
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no intent to modify the "existing rules governing the longshoreman's maritime negligence suit against the shipowner by
diminishing damages recoverable from the latter on the basis
of the proportionate fault of the non-party stevedore ... .,314
The Court stated that "[flor a number of reasons, we are unpersuaded that Congress intended to upset a 'long-established
and familiar principl[e]' of maritime law by imposing a proportionate fault rule." '6 5 The majority of the Court was
unable to distill from the face of the obviously awkward
wording of the two sentences any indication that Congress
intended to modify the pre-existing rule that a longshoreman who was injured by the concurrent negligence of the
stevedore and the ship may recover for the entire amount of
36 6
his injuries from the ship.
In the Court's opinion, the "legislative history strongly counsel[ed] ' 367 against the proportionate fault rule of the circuit
court since the "reports and debates leading up to the 1972
amendments contained not a word of this concept." 8" The
Court also believed that the proportionate fault rule adopted
by the circuit court produced "consequences that we doubt
Congress intended. It may remove some inequities, but it creates others and appears to shift some burden to the longshoreman."36 9 The Court was especially concerned that in the
sorting out of liabilities among the parties, an unfair portion
of the burden would be shifted to the injured
longshoreman.3 0
Under the Court of Appeals' proportionate fault rule,
however, there will be many circumstances where the longshoreman will not be able to recover in any way the full
amount of the damages determined in his suit against the
vessel.... Under the Court of Appeals' proportionate fault
system, the longshoreman would get very little, if any, of the
diminished recovery obtained by his employer. Indeed, unless the vessel's proportionate fault exceeded the ratio of
364. 99 S. Ct. 2753, 2758 (1979).

365. Id. at 2758 (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)).
366. Id. at 2759-60.
367. Id. at 2760.

368. Id.
369. Id. at 2761.
370. Id.
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compensation benefits to total damages, the longshoreman
would receive nothing from the third-party action, and the
negligent stevedore might recoup all the compensation benefits it had paid.
Some inequity appears inevitable in the present statutory scheme, but we find nothing to indicate and should not
presume that Congress intended to place the burden of the
inequity on the longshoreman whom the Act seeks to
protect. 7 1

The second ground relied upon by the Court for not
changing the "rule so as to make the vessels liable only for the
damages in proportion to its own negligence" 3 72 was the "interface of statutory and judge-made law" 37 3 which existed in
this area.
In 1972, Congress aligned the rights and liabilities of stevedores, shipowners, and longshoremen in light of the rules of
maritime law that it chose not to change .... By now
changing what we have already established that Congress
understood to be the law, and did not itself wish to modify,
we may knock out of kilter this delicate balance. As our
cases advise, we should stay our hand in these circumstances
....
Once Congress has relied upon conditions that the
courts have created, we are not as free as we could otherwise
be to change them.37 4
The court refused to uphold the particular proportionate fault
rule (equitable credit) established by the circuit court both
because it could find no legislative intent compelling this result and because change in this area was more appropriately a
congressional task.
In fashioning any loss-allocation scheme to balance the equities between a negligent employer and a negligent third
party, one must keep in mind certain provisions of the
LHWCA. Section 914 of the Act compels an employer to periodically and promptly pay compensation benefits directly to
the injured employee "without an award. 3 7 5 Under section
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.

Id. at 2761-62.
Id. at 2762.
Id. at 2763.
Id.
33 U.S.C. § 914(a) (1976).
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907, the employer must furnish "medical, surgical, and other
attendance or treatment, nurse and hospital service, medicine
. . .and apparatus, for such period as the nature of the injury
or the process of recovery may require. 8' 76 Section 904 man-

dates that compensation "shall be payable irrespective of
fault as a cause for the injury."'37 Under section 933, an in-

jured employee is given the additional right to recover damages against a third party in tort. 78 The employee need not
elect between receiving compensation and recovering damages
in an action in court. Paragraph (b) of section 933 does stipulate that if an employer contests liability for compensation
payments under the LHWCA and an award is made compelling the employer to pay such benefits, there is "an assignment to the employer of the injured employee's cause of action against the third party unless the employee commences
suit against the third party within six months after such
award.

37 9

Paragraph (e) sets out a schedule of distribution

whenever an employer recovers against a third party on an
assigned cause of action. 80 Paragraph (h) subrogates the employer's compensation insurance carrier to all the rights of the
employees under section 933.381 Whenever an assignment is

made and an employer recovers against a third party, the employer is entitled to retain an amount equal to his expenses in
bringing this suit, the cost of benefits paid under section 907,
all amounts paid as compensation and one-fifth of whatever is
left before returning the remaining amount to the employee.382 Thus, in many cases where an assignment is made,
an employer, regardless of any causal negligence on his part, is
reimbursed for any payments made as compensation or medical expenses under the LHWCA. This reimbursement comes
from the third-party damage award. It seems inequitable for a
stevedore-employer who is, for example, forty percent causally
negligent for the injury sustained by its employee, to recoup
all of its statutorily-imposed liability in relation to the em376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.

33 U.S.C. § 907(a) (1976).
33 U.S.C. § 904(b) (1976).
33 U.S.C. § 933(a) (1976).
Id. at (b).
Id. at (e).
Id. at (h).
Id. at (e).
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ployee and to contribute nothing to the third party who might
be equally or less negligent. This loss-allocation arrangement
is particularly inappropriate under the comparative negligence
system which Congress instituted in the 1972 amendments to
the LHWCA. However, Congress chose to leave paragraph (e)
of section 933 intact, and the Supreme Court in Edmonds recognized that courts have no power to alter the assignment distribution schedule.3 83 This provision for receiving reimbursement of the amount of compensation benefits paid to an
injured employee from a third-party tort recovery is a usual
feature of most compensation systems.38 4 The negligent third
party serves as a source from which an employer may recoup
the cost of absolute liability compelled by the Act.
There are three other ways, in addition to the section
933(b) assignment, whereby an employer who becomes obligated to pay compensation to an employee may recover from
a negligent third party. The employer may bring an action directly against the third party in tort to recover the amount of
compensation benefits paid in excess of the amount to which
it was subrogated under section 933;185 it may intervene in an
action brought by an employee;38 6 or, it may allow the employee to prosecute the action himself and assert a lien
against the amount of the employee's judgment. 38 7 None of
these methods, however, has given any indication whether the
employer's right to reimbursement is defeated when the employee's injuries are caused by the concurring negligence of
the employer, one of its agents, or a third party. Although the
assignment provision of section 933 appears to be absolute
and not dependent in any way on whether or not the em383. 99 S. Ct. at 2761-62.
384. See 2A A. LARSON, THE

LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

§ 74.31 at 14-213

(1976).

385. See Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 404
(1969).
386. See, e.g., Bloomer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 100 S. Ct. 925 (1980); Bachtel v.
Mammoth Bulk Carriers, Ltd., 605 F.2d 438, 439, 446 (9th Cir. 1979); FED. R. Civ. P.
24(a)(2). Although Bachtel states that the stevedore-employer "intervened pursuant
to 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1976) and asserted a lien," Id. at 439, that section makes no
provision for intervention in a case where an injured longshoreman brings the action.
Instead, intervention is properly allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
387. See The Etna, 138 F.2d 37 (3d Cir. 1943); Fontana v. Penn. R.R. Co., 106 F.
Supp. 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), aff'd sub noma. mem., Fontana v. Grace Line, Inc., 205
F.2d 151 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 886 (1953).
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ployer was causally negligent, the same cannot be said for any
of the other means by which a compensation-paying employer
may claim reimbursement for benefits paid.
The right of an employer to proceed directly against a negligent third party for any deficiency in the damage award and
the right to apply a lien against any judgment recovered by
the injured employee, are judicially created. In Federal
Marine Terminal, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co.,188 the Supreme Court held that the right of assignment under section
933 of the LHWCA was not an exclusive grant of recovery to
an employer of the amount of benefits it had been forced to
pay on account of the negligence of a third party. The Court
held that an employer had a cause of action in tort for the
compensation payments caused by the negligence of a third
party. In The Etna,3 19 the Third Circuit was faced with a situation wherein an employer had made compensation payments
to an injured employee without an award, and the employee
had subsequently commenced a third-party action against the
shipowner and recovered a judgment. The employer then attempted to recover the amount of its compensation payment
from the damage award. The employee refused to reimburse
the employer on the grounds that, since the compensation was
not paid "under an award,"3890 he was under no compulsion to
repay the employer for the amount of compensation benefits
made. The circuit court found that the assignment provision
of section 933 "neither expresses nor implies a restriction
upon the employer's right to subrogation, the circumstances
being otherwise appropriate."3 9 1 Thus, the court found that
there existed a "right to subrogation which, under equitable
principles, attaches where one, not acting officiously, pays
money on account of a legal obligation resting upon him for
the imposition whereof another is held pecuniarily responsible. 3 92 Under this theory, even though the LHWCA afforded
the employer no statutory right of recovery, there was an equitable right under which he might do so.
Although the court in The Etna labeled the right of the
388.
389.
390.
391.

394
138
See
138

U.S. 404 (1969).
F.2d 37 (3d Cir. 1943).
33 U.S.C. § 933(b) (1940).
F.2d 37, 41 (3d Cir. 1943).

392. Id. at 39.
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employer for reimbursement a right of "subrogation," that
was, strictly speaking, not the case. Subrogation is broadly defined as the substitution of one party in the place of another
with reference to a lawful claim or right.3 93 It is the method by
which the equities in favor of one person, such as the employer, are resolved via the legal rights of another, such as the
employee. However, such is not the case in a workers' compensation-third-party suit. The employer does not seek to be
"put in the shoes" of the employee so that he might seek
a
recovery through the legal rights of the employee against a
negligent third party. Instead, the employer merely seeks to
be reimbursed from any sufficient recovery of an employee
from a negligent third party. Under proper circumstances, this
creates the situation for imposition of an equitable lien. An
equitable lien is the right to have a fund applied in whole or
in part to the payment of a particular obligation-3 4 Like equitable subrogation, it does not arise in favor of a mere volunteer.3 9 5 "Where the equitable lien is on a fund . . . it is enforced by a direction to pay the claimant out of the fund. 3 96
The Edmonds case correctly recognized that- The Etna had
created an equitable lien and not a right of subrogation. 9 7
Even before the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA, negligent third parties had attempted to have the amount of compensation benefits made by the employer, to which The Etna
equitable lien attached, applied as an offsetting credit against
any damage award recovered in a tort action by the injured
employee.3 9 s That question was not addressed by the court in
The Etna because the controversy there was between the employee and the employer; the shipowner was not a party to the
appeal. At the outset, then, it appears that the enforcement of
an equitable lien for the full amount of workers' compensation
benefits paid is a satisfactory result only when the employer is
not at fault in any degree. "The rule produces palpably unfair

393. See 73 AM. JUR. 2d Subrogation § 1 (1974).
394. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITtmON § 161, Comment b (1937).
395. See 51 Am. JUR. 2d Liens § 24 at 163 (1970).
396. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 161, Comment b (1937).
397. Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 99 S. Ct. 2753, 2761
(1979).
398. See, e.g., Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 411-12 (1953) (shipowner's contention).
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results in every other case." 399 In Halcyon, the circuit court

had decided that a right of "contribution

' 40 0

existed between

an employer who was seventy-five percent negligent and a
third party who was twenty-five percent negligent. But the
court further held that the amount the employer could be
compelled to pay could not exceed the amount determined by
the employer's workers' compensation liability.401 On appeal

to the Supreme Court, both parties agreed that the decision of
the circuit court "limiting an employer's liability for contribution to those uncertain amounts recoverable under the Harbor
Workers' Act is impractical and undesirable, 40 2 and each
urged a different rule. The Supreme Court noted that it had
"never expressly applied" 40 3 a rule of contribution to noncollision maritime cases, and stated that the establishment of such
a rule was better left to Congress which could give a fair accommodation to the diverse interests of the various groups involved. The Court specifically found it unnecessary to decide
whether the LHWCA precluded any right of contribution be404
tween an employer and a negligent third party.
In Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn,'405 both the employer and

a third party were adjudged negligent, and on appeal to the
Supreme Court the third party contended that the damage
award against it should be reduced by the amount of compensation payments made by the employer.40 8 The Court rejected

the third party's claim on two grounds. First, it stated that
section 933 of the LHWCA specifically allowed an employer
"to recoup his compensation payment out of any recovery
from a third person negligently causing such injuries. "407
Neither party to the appeal had suggested that section 933
was, in fact, applicable to the facts of the case, since the employer had not paid the compensation benefits "under an
399. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 405 (1975) (Stewart, J.,
commenting on the traditional equal division rule in collision cases).
400. Baccile v. Halcyon Lines, 187 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1951).
401. Id.
402. Halcyon v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 284 (1952).
403. Id.
404. Id. at 286 n.12.
405. 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
406. Id. at 411-12.
407. Id. at 412.
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award.' ' 40 8 The Court's reliance on that section was thus mis-

placed. The remaining ground upon which it rejected the
third party's claim for a credit offset was that it "would be the
substantial equivalent of contribution which we declined to
require in the Halcyon case.' ' 4 °9 This second ground was also

misplaced. Contribution, as discussed above, 10 is a right of
one who has discharged a common obligation to recover from
another, also liable, that proportion which the latter rightly
owes and ought to bear. It arises where one joint wrongdoer
has paid more than his fair share of the common liability incurred by several parties. It differs from subrogation, which
gives the party paying the common obligations all the rights
and remedies of the compensated party, and from an equitable lien, which enforces payment from a recovered fund. Contribution compels one who is liable but who has not yet paid
his fair share of the common obligation to do so. The contributory payment is made not to the plaintiff, but to the joint
wrongdoer who has paid a disproportionate share of the common burden. The general rule is that an employer may not,
strictly speaking, be a joint tortfeasor liable in contribution,
since the employer's liability is imposed, as well as limited, by
the provisions of a workers' compensation act, while that of
the third-party tortfeasor rests on the principles of
negligence.1
An equitable lien credit rule does not seek to compel contribution, a payment of the employer's fair share of the common liability to the third party, but, instead, seeks to adjust
the equities of the situation to insure that the wrongdoing employer is not allowed to recoup benefits which he was absolutely compelled to pay regardless of fault. It seeks not to impose, directly or indirectly, a liability of the employer to the
third party, but to insure that the employer does not escape
his statutory duty under the compensation act to the injured
employee. It seeks not to effect a subterfuge, but to insure

408. See Kuger v. Dampskisaktieselskabet Int'l, 170 F. Supp. 601, 606 (S.D. Cal.
1959), aff'd sub nom. Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Dampskisaktieselskabet Int'l, 274
F.2d 875 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 803 (1960).
409. 346 U.S. 406, 412 (1953).
410. See text accompanying notes 278-79 supra.
411. See Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 99 S. Ct. 2753, 2764
n.2 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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that the equities of the situation are not abused or perverted.
An equitable lien credit rule seeks to insure that some of the
burden of monetary compensation to the victim is placed ultimately on an employer "whose default caused [in part] the

injury.''

12

In Halcyon and Hawn, the Court held that a third-party
defendant was not entitled to have the judgment reduced by
the amount of compensation that the plaintiff had received
from his employer. In so holding, the Court allowed the employer to assert its Etna lien; assignment under section 933
was unavailable since the compensation was not paid under
an award. In each case, this defense was equated with an attempt to secure contribution between joint tortfeasors. Especially in Halcyon, the Court's refusal to allow the third party
to have the judgment against him reduced was based not on
any apparent conflict with the provisions of the LHWCA, but
on the Court's hesitancy to "fashion new judicial rules of con414
tribution."' 13 The Court's decision in Cooper Stevedoring
unequivocally established a rule of general maritime law
which allows contribution between joint tortfeasors, even in
noncollision cases. Thus, in the absence of the LHWCA, a
negligent third party would be allowed contribution against a
concurrently negligent employer when the third party has
paid more than its proportionate share of the common liability. To the extent that the prohibition against contribution in
Halcyon and Hawn relied on the absence of a maritime rule
allowing contribution in noncollision cases, the Court's reasoning has been rendered obsolete.
In Cooper Stevedoring, the Court stated that the "factors
14 5
underlying our decision in Halcyon still have much force'

and that the "decision in Halcyon was, and still is, a good law
on its facts.' 41' The Court made these assertions in response
to an argument by a joint tortfeasor that Halcyon stood for
the rule of an absolute bar against contribution in noncollision
412. Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S.
315, 324 (1964).
413. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 285
(1952).
414. Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106 (1974).
415. Id. at 112.
416. Id. at 115.
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cases. 417 To support its assertions, the Court made reference
to the congressional enactment of the amendments to the
LHWCA. "Indeed, the 1972 amendments . . . re-emphasized
Congress' determination that as between an employer and its
injured employee, the right to compensation under the Act
should be the employee's exclusive remedy. 4 18 While this
statement is true, it is wholly irrelevant to the issue presented
in that case. There was no argument in that case as to the
amount of liability between the employer and its injured employee. Instead, the disagreement was over the allocation of
liability between two joint tortfeasors. Therefore, Cooper
Stevedoring serves to breathe no new vitality into the obsolete
reasoning of Halcyon and Hawn.
If contribution is to be denied between a negligent employer and a negligent third party, that denial must rest on
grounds other than Halcyon, Hawn and Cooper Stevedoring.
Support for the rejection of any rule against contribution can,
in fact, be found in the amendment to section 905 enacted by
Congress in 1972. Section 905(b) states that "the employer
shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or
indirectly."4'19 Both the House and Senate reports accompanying the amendments state that since the warranty of seaworthiness was abrogated, "there is no longer any necessity for
permitting the vessel to recover the damages for which it is
liable to the injured worker from the stevedore or other employer of the worker.' 4 20 The reports further state that "indemnity or contribution agreements are prohibited by the
act.' 421 But the stipulations in section 905(b) limit only contribution or indemnity from a negligent employer for damages, i.e., those awards made in a third-party tort action between an injured employee and a joint tortfeasor. The section
in no way affects the absolute liability of an employer to make
compensation payments to an injured employee. Further, it
in no way goes to the issue of whether or not an equitable lien
should be allowed a negligent employer under the doctrine of

417. Id. at 111.
418. Id. at 112-13.
419. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976).
420. 1972 HOUSE REP., supra note 95, at 7, reprintedin [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 4704, and 1972 SEN. REP., supra note 95, at 11.
421. Id.
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The Etna. A colloquy at a Senate hearing on the 1972 amendments between the key draftsman of section 905422 and a testifying witness indicates that the prohibition against contribution or indemnity was meant to eradicate a very specific
practice in the maritime industry.4 23 What the committee
draftsman sought to prohibit was hold-harmless agreements
given by the stevedore-employer to the shipowner, which insulated the shipowner against liability for its own negligence. 2 4 This being the express purpose of that particular
clause in section 905(b), it should not be construed to interfere with the modification of equitable lien rights between the
parties.
B.

Application

The comparative negligence system of fault allocation instituted by Congress under the 1972 amendments should not
be avoided because of the reasoning of cases decided prior to
adoption of the amendments. The question now is how the
courts should interpret the Etna lien rule to reflect the advent
of comparative responsibility among negligent parties, employers and nonemployers. The comparative fault system
principle that the employer and a third party should, to the
extent consistent with the employer's statutory immunity
from tort liability, share the burden of the employee's recovery as joint tortfeasors, leads to the logical and equitable conclusion that the concurrently negligent employer should receive an equitable lien or reimbursement only for the amount
by which its compensation liability exceeds its proportional
share of the injured employee's recovery.
The rule of lien rights formulated in The Etna is not a
rule of contribution. Neither is the rule of equitable lien credit
rights a rule of contribution, compelling the negligent employer to "contribute" any of the lien right amount to the
third party tortfeasor. Rather an equitable lien credit rule is
an equitable rule of accommodation between negligent parties; it asks the court to equitably disallow a lien right until
such time as it would be equitable to reinstate it. It adheres
422. See note 137 supra.
423. See text accompanying note 139 supra.
424. Id.
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strictly to the Etna lien consideration, and not any other. An
equitable lien credit does not ask the court to fashion new judicial rules of contribution, a task which the Supreme Court
declined in both Halcyon4 25 and Edmonds, 2 but undertook
in Cooper Stevedoring.2 7 Instead, such a rule asks the courts

to modify the rule judicially created in The Etna. What negligent third parties have, in effect, been advocating is that,
since double recoveries to injured employees have been
avoided all along, either by allowing an assignment under section 933 or allowing an equitable lien under the Etna rule, it
would be more equitable in cases where the employer is negligent not to use the damages allocable to the employer's fault
to repay its lien, but rather to reduce the liability of third parties by the amount of the compensation benefits paid or to be
paid, at least to the extent that those benefits fall short of the
percentage share of responsibility attributed to the employer.
Challenge to such hybridization cannot fairly be based on
any supposed insurmountable distinction between a faultbased and a nonfault-based system. The argument often is
that the workers' compensation and tort recovery systems are
mutually exclusive. They are, however, intimately related in
several respects. The Supreme Court has itself noted that the
two systems present "an interface of statutory and judgemade law"'428 characterized by "the overlap of loss-allocating
mechanisms that are guided by somewhat inconsistent principles." ' 4 29 Section

904 of the LHWCA states

that

"[c]ompensation shall be payable irrespective of fault as a
cause for the injury,"'430 but an employer need not pay benefits if an employee's injuries were caused by the "willful intention" 4311 of the employee, a tort-based distinction of fault.
While an employee may collect a statutorily regulated benefit
under the Act, he retains a right to bring a tort action of his

425.
426.
427.
428.
(1979).
429.
430.
431.

Halcyon v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 99 S. Ct. 2753 (1979).
Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106 (1974).
Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 99 S. Ct. 2753, 2763
Id. at 2757.
33 U.S.C. § 904(b) (1976).
Id.
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own to recover from a third party for the same injuries. 4 3 2
Further, though an employer must furnish an injured worker
with medical and surgical treatment, nurse and hospital services, and medicine, 433 he retains a tort action against a negligent third party to recover any such amounts incurred because of the third party's negligence.4 34 If an injured employee
fails to commence a third-party suit in tort within six months
of the later of the last voluntary payment or a formal compensation award, his tort cause of action is assigned by statute to
his employer or its carrier.43 5 Ifthe injured employee brings
the action himself, the employer has-a lien upon any recovery
for benefits paid under the compensation scheme. 4 6 An employer's compensation insurance carrier is entitled to be subrogated to any of the tort rights of the employer.4 37 An employer also has an independent tort action against a third
party to recover any deficiency existing between the thirdparty recovery or settlement and the amount of compensation
438
benefits paid by the employer under the LHWCA.
The Supreme Court in Edmonds impliedly advised against
any attempts to evaluate the Etna lien rule to reflect the advent of comparative responsibility among negligent parties.
The Court stated that when Congress has relied upon conditions that the courts have created, "we are not as free as we
would otherwise be to change them. ' 439 The Etna lien rule is,
of course, judicially created, and re-evaluation of the doctrine
in the Etna case does not require the courts to alter the construction of any provision of the LHWCA in any manner.
Under the circumstances of the 1972 amendments, the Court's
pronouncement that congressional reliance on prior court rulings has restricted the ability of the Court to shape the law is
utter fiction. There is not a scintilla of evidence in the legislative history indicating that Congress in any way relied on the

432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
(1969).
439.

Id. at (a).
Id.
Id. at (h).
Id. at (b).
See The Etna, 138 F.2d 37 (3d Cir. 1943).
33 U.S.C. § 933(h) (1976).
See Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 404
99 S. Ct. 2753, 2763 (1979).
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judicially created Etna rule in fashioning the 1972 amendments. The hearings and committee reports indicate that the
Etna rule was never a topic of substantive discussion. 40 Even
if it were, there was no legislative ratification of that rule
under the 1972 amendments. To impute to Congress an intent
to ratify, or even to premise its legislative enactments on, a
judicially created rule, such a rule clearly must have been
brought to the attention of Congress during consideration of
the legislation; 44 ' discussion of it must have been more than a
mere mention in the thousands of pages of legislative history;442 and the key supporters of the legislation must have
been "familiar with existing rulings, or. . .they [must have
meant] to incorporate them, whatever they may [have
been.] ' ' "4 3 None of these requirements was evidenced in the
enactment of the 1972 amendments.
The deferential attitude by the Supreme Court to a supposed reliance by Congress on a judicially created condition is
especially foreign to the maritime law. "Admiralty law is
judge-made law to a great extent"'444 and "the Judiciary has
traditionally taken the lead in formulating flexible and fair
remedies in the law maritime." 4 4 5 It is the constant interplay
between judge-made and statutory law through which the
maritime law evolves and remains a growing, adapting body of
policies, rules and relationships. The courts must undertake
their role in that continuous evolutionary process. A posture
of judicial deference to an imagined legislative reliance on the
status quo is not compatible with such growth. The oblique
implication put forth in Edmonds cannot fairly be extended
to foreclose judicial efforts to reshape judicial rules.
One of the major results of Congress' enactment of the
1972 amendments was the establishment of a system under

440. See note 494 infra.
441. See, e.g., TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 192 (1978); United States v. Calamaro,
354 U.S. 351, 358-59 (1957); Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431
(1955); Helvering v. New York Trust Co., 292 U.S. 455, 468 (1934).
442. SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 121 (1978).
443. Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 154 F.2d 785, 790 (2d Cir.) (L.
Hand, J.), aff'd, 328 U.S. 275 (1946). See also Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14,
21 (1946) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
444. Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 99 S. Ct. 2753, 2756
(1979).
445. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 409 (1975).
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which liability for damage is to be imposed in proportion to
respective fault. It is somewhat anomalous, however, that a
negligent third party causing injury to a person may seek proportionate contribution from all solvent joint tortfeasors
whose causal negligence combines to produce the injury, but
may not seek to hold the injured party's negligent employer
liable even for an amount no greater than the employer's statutorily imposed compensation benefit liability. It is true that
in the first instance the wrongdoers are joint tortfeasors and
no workers' compensation scheme is involved. Nevertheless,
the factor of a compensation program should not allow a negligent employer to avoid liability, even its statutory responsibility to make compensation payments.
An injured employee's desire to secure a third-party tort
recovery in addition to the guaranteed benefits under a statutory workers' compensation scheme, an election allowed under
almost every state plan, 4" has the effect, if the employee recovers a substantial sum from the third-party tortfeasor, of
converting a system whereby an employer pays regardless of
fault into a system whereby an employer is relieved of paying
regardless of fault. Such a procedure is illogical and unfair. As
between an employee and his employer, the statutory workers'
compensation scheme should serve as an absolute limit of an
employer's liability. The combination of a third-party action
in tort by an employee with the operation of a compensation
scheme should not relieve a wrongdoing employer of this absolute liability. Combining a system which imposes liability
without fault with a system imposing liability only on the basis of fault should not result in relieving a party of liability
without regard to fault. Workers' compensation systems were
not enacted to serve as temporary benefit schemes to sustain
an injured employee until he could recover from a wrongdoing
third party in tort, and then, subsequently, reimburse in full a
wrongdoing employer out of that tort recovery. If this were so,
how could it honestly be maintained that workers' compensation plans are loss-allocation systems which insure that the
"cost of the product should bear the blood of the workman"? 447 The "interface of statutory and judge-made law" 448

446. See note 334 supra.
447. W. PROSSER,THE LAW OF TORTS, § 80, at 530 (4th ed. 1971).
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should not stand an absolute liability system on its head and
shake from it all logic and equity.
If the relative fault of the employee and the fault of the
third party can be compared, what reason exists for not proportioning the comparative responsibility of the employer as
well? If included in the proportion and if found causally negligent, the employer's negligence should have a direct bearing
on its compensation lien recovery. This can be accomplished
only by examining its lien and assignment rights for benefits
already paid to the employee. In this way, the employee is denied a double recovery, as he should be; but, as between the
employer and a third party, the burden of liability is apportioned according to actual fault.
This system whereby the employee gets his full damages,
the employer pays his percentage of liability but not above
the level of the compensation payments which he has been
and will be obliged to pay regardless of fault, and the third
party is relieved of the obligation of paying the full judgment,
is not novel. It was the one proposed by the circuit court in
Halcyon,449 the one later suggested but not applied by Judge
Friendly in the Second Circuit,4

50

and the one applied by the

California Supreme Court in Associated Construction & Engineering Co. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board.451 In
that case, the California court decided that in light of the judicially developed doctrine of comparative fault prevailing in
that state, the best way to harmonize the interests of a negligent employer and a negligent third party would be to apportion liability as far as possible. The mechanics of such a procedure were set out by the court as follows:
When the issue of an employer's concurrent negligence
arises in a judicial forum, application of comparative negligence principles is relatively straightforward. The third
party tortfeasor should be allowed to plead the employer's
negligence as a partial defense ....

Once this issue is in-

jected into the trial, the trier of fact should determine the
employer's degree of fault according to the principles of...
[comparative negligence]. The court should then deduct the
448.
449.
450.
451.

99 S. Ct. 2753, 2763 (1979).
Baccile v. Halcyon Lines, 187 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1951).
Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714, 726 n.8 (2d Cir. 1978).
22 Cal. 3d 829, 587 P.2d 684, 150 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1978).
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employer's percentage share of the employee's total recovery
from the third party's liability-up to the amount of the
workers' compensation benefits assessed against the employer. Correspondingly, the employer should be denied any
claim of reimbursement-or any lien . . .- to the extent
that his contribution would then fall short of his percentage
452
share of responsibility for the employee's total recovery.
Once responsibility has been apportioned, the recoverable
damage award is determined by first subtracting from the total award the proportionate amount attributable to the injured employee's negligence, and then subtracting the proportionate amount attributable to the employer's negligence up
4 53
to the amount of the workers' compensation benefits paid.
Once an employer's compensation contribution corresponds to
his proportional share of fault, the employer should be
granted full lien rights on any amounts paid over that level. 4 "
"Only when such level of contribution has been reached, however, will grant of the. . . credit adequately accommodate the
principle that a negligent employer should not profit from his
455

own wrong."'

This equitable lien credit rule is structured in such a manner that the employee fully recovers his tort damages-but
from the proper parties. As the California court stated:
Allowing the concurrently negligent employer a credit limited in this fashion is rational if non-negligent employers are
to be permitted credit; each profits, if at all, only to the extent it committed no wrong.... The employer does not
profit from its wrong, nor does the employee enjoy a double
56
recovery.4
As the California court pointed out, under such a rule, "[a]n
employer will obtain a reduction of its workers' compensation
liability only if its degree of negligence is so small that its
statutory liability exceeds its percentage share of the tort
measure of damages.' 57 There is nothing unfair in this to the
452. Id. at 842, 587 P.2d at 692, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
453. See Aveces v. Regal Pale Brewing Co., 24 Cal. 3d 502,
156 Cal. Rptr. 41, 46 (1979).
454. 22 Cal. 3d at 843, 587 P.2d at 692, 150 Cal. Rptr. at
455. Id.
456. 22 Cal. 3d at 846, 587 P.2d at 694, 150 Cal. Rptr. at
457. 22 Cal. 3d at 846, 587 P.2d at 695, 150 Cal. Rptr. at

512, 595 P.2d 619, 624,
896.
898.
899.
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employer. The employer pays its statutorily imposed obligation, irrespective of fault, but because of its comparative responsibility it is denied the recoupment of that statutory
amount. Section 905(b) of the LHWCA is not contravened because such a rule does not make the employer "liable to the
vessel for . .. damages directly or indirectly ... .""" First,
under the equitable lien credit rule, an employer is not liable
to the vessel or any other negligent third party. The employer
is liable only to the employee by reason of its statutory compensation obligation. Second, under the rule, the employer is
not liable for damages, but only for the compensation benefits which it is required to pay regardless of fault in any circumstance where an employee is injured.
Language in the Supreme Court's decision in Bloomer v.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. 459 should not be interpreted as
precluding application by the lower courts of the proposed
loss-allocation procedures. In light of the question presented
for discussion and the grounds asserted for the holding by the
Court, the case must be read narrowly.
In Bloomer, an injured longshoreman brought suit against
a shipowner alleging that its negligence had caused his injuries. During settlement negotiations the plaintiff's counsel requested that the stevedore-employer and its compensation insurance carrier reduce their nonstatutory lien by a share of
the costs of recovery. The compensation insurance carrier refused this request and successfully moved to intervene in the
action. Thereafter, the plaintiff settled with the shipowner for
$60,000. The question presented for decision by the Court was
whether the stevedore's judicially created lien should be reduced by a proportionate share of the longshoreman's expenses in obtaining recovery from the shipowner, or whether
the stevedore was entitled to be reimbursed for the full
amount of the compensation payments made to the plaintiff
under the LHWCA. Finding no explicit answer in the Act itself, the Court turned to the structure and history4 60 of the
LHWCA.
The Court found that the provisions of section 933 provid-

458. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976).
459. 100 S. Ct. 925 (1980).
460. Id. at 927.
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ing that a stevedore-employer or its compensation carrier be
reimbursed for all legal expenses utilized in obtaining a thirdparty recovery under a statutory assignment of an injured
longshoreman's cause of action applied "with considerable
force against requiring ... [the stevedore-employer or its
compensation carrier] to bear a part of the longshoreman's
costs when the longshoreman recovers on his own. There is no
reason to believe that Congress intended a different distribution of the expenses of suit merely because the longshoreman
has brought the action. ' 46 1 This statement, however, has little
to support it. Section 933 makes no provision for an equitable
lien of any kind on the part of a stevedore-employer who has
paid compensation to an injured employee. Even applying a
basic rule of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mere fact that a specific distribution and
reimbursement scheme is provided when a stevedore-employer recovers on an assigned cause of action but no such distribution is provided when the injured employee himself recovers, undercuts the very contention that the Court makes. It
is only the lien judicially created in The Etna46 2 which gives a
stevedore-employer and its compensation carrier a claim for
reimbursement.
The legislative history and amendments to section 933
speak with considerable force against the contention put forward by the Court. When the distribution scheme set forth in
section 933 was devised in 1927,463 an injured employee could
not recover both compensation benefits and a third-party
damage award. 4 " Rather, an express, initial election was required between benefits on the one hand and a third-party
tort action on the other. Thus, at the time it was first developed, the distribution plan in section 933 could not have been
intended by Congress to apply to instances where the injured
longshoreman recovered a damage award from a negligent
third party. The distribution system was meant to apply only
when there could be compensation benefits and a third-party
recovery, i.e., after an employee had accepted benefits and his

461.
462.
463.
464.

Id. at 928.
138 F.2d 37 (3d Cir. 1943).
Ch. 509, § 33(e), 44 Stat. 1440 (1927).
Id.; see cases in note 188 supra.
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stevedore-employer had recovered under the assigned cause of
action. Section 933 cannot be invoked as support for the judicially created lien rights of employers; they must stand or fall
in their own right.
In 1938,485 Congress undertook to change the provision in
section 933 which made the mere acceptance of compensation
benefits operate as an assignment of "all right of the person
entitled to compensation to recover damages against . . . [a]
third person."'4" The very fact that Congress changed this
scheme to provide for an automatic assignment only if the injured employee elected to accept benefits "under an award,"
leaving untouched the situation where he could accept benefits voluntarily paid by the employer under section 90447 and
bring a third-party damage action on his own without thereby
assigning his cause of action to his stevedore-employer, serves
as strong proof that Congress left it to the courts to fashion
equitable rules. If Congress had meant to apply the system set
forth in section 933(e), 8 or any variation thereof, to damage
awards recovered solely by an employee who has also received
compensation benefits but not "under an award," it easily
might have done so at the very time it saw fit to eliminate the
mandatory assignment procedure enacted in 1927. That it did
not codify any rule to cover such damage recovery situation,
which surely must have been within its contemplation at the
time it made a change in the section, speaks strongly of no
congressional rule in this area.
Should Congress have wished to act in 1938 with regard to
a stevedore-employer's recoupment of compensation benefits
from a damage award gained by an injured longshoreman, it
would have been especially prudent to do so at that time.
Under the 1938 amendments as enacted, an employee still had
to make an election whether to accept benefits or seek a thirdparty recovery. But the mere fact that the employee accepted
benefits in the interim period, while deciding whether or not
to commence an action, did not serve as an automatic assignment of his cause of action, as it had under the 1927 statute.

465.
466.
467.
468.

Ch. 685, § 12, 52 Stat. 1168 (1938).
33 U.S.C. § 933(b) (1940).
33 U.S.C. § 904 (1940).
33 U.S.C. § 933(e) (1940).
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Thus, it would often have happened that an injured longshoreman would draw benefits for, say, a six-month period
and then elect to commence a suit. While the employer need
not continue to pay benefits after that election, the employer
still would desire to recoup the benefits paid out during that
six-month interim period. Congress chose to provide no statutory means for an employer to do so. That it should not have
acted to do so indicates a legislative choice to let the courts
fashion suitable rules under the general maritime law.
Similarly, under the 1959 amendment 6 9 to section 933,
Congress chose not only to abolish the necessity for election
by an injured longshoreman between receiving benefits and
seeking a third-party damage award, but also to eliminate the
mandatory assignment of the employee's cause of action to
the stevedore-employer whenever benefits were accepted
"under an award" if the employee commenced a third-party
suit within six months thereafter. 470 These changes created

two situations where an employee could receive benefits and a
third-party damage recovery. Yet, Congress abstained from
enacting a statutory rule to cover such circumstances, leaving
only the federal courts to fashion such rules.
The Supreme Court in Bloomer sought support in the legislative history pursuant to the 1959 amendment to section
47 1
933 for its assertion that "Congress did not intend to alter"
the judicially created Etna lien right of a stevedore-employer.
It sought this support on three different grounds. First, it
quoted a Senate report 472 accompanying the 1959 amendment
as saying that "'an employer must be reimbursed for any
compensation paid to the employee out of the net proceeds of
a recovery.' ", 7 3 This selective quotation is quite misleading

since the entire quotation from the Senate report referred to
by the Court reads as follows:
Although an employee could receive compensation under the
act and for the same injury recover damages in a third-party
469. Pub. L. No. 86-171, 73 Stat. 391 (1959).
470. Id.
471. 100 S. Ct. 925, 929 (1980).
472. S. REP. No. 428, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2134.
473. 100 S. Ct. 925, 929 (1980) (quoting S. REP. No. 428, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2,
reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2134, 2135).
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suit, he would not be entitled to double compensation. The
bill, provides that an employer must be reimbursed for any
compensation paid to the employee out of the net proceeds
of the recovery." 4
What the Senate report stated is that the bill itself4 5 provides
that an employer must be reimbursed for any compensation
paid to an injured employee under the Act. But this statement contained in the committee report is wholly incorrect.
The bill referred to,47 6 the very one enacted into law in 1959
by Congress, made no provision whatsoever that an employer
must be reimbursed for any compensation paid to an injured
employee. Just as previous versions enacted by Congress had
provided, 7 and just as the current version of section 933 provides, 47 1 an employer would be reimbursed only when it
gained a third-party recovery on a cause of action assigned to
it. The bill referred to in the committee report made no provision for codifying the Etna lien right rule.
Further, the Supreme Court asserted that "[d]uring the
hearings on the 1959 amendments, the rule that an employer
would not be required to bear a proportionate share of the
longshoreman's cost of recovery was specifically drawn to
Congress' attention, and one witness suggested that it should
be abandoned. ' 47 9 The Court was again mistaken in its very
assertion. To support its contention that "[d]uring the hearings on the 1959 amendments ' 48 0 Congress considered the
question whether a stevedore-employer should bear a proportionate share of a longshoreman's expenses in seeking a thirdparty recovery the Court referred to hearings before a 1956
House special subcommittee.4 8 1 Surely it cannot be contended
that testimony before a committee of a different body of the

474. S. REP. No. 428, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2134, 2135.
475. H.R. 451, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 105 CONG. REC. 12674-75 (1959). See also 105
CONG. REc. 15343 (1959) (House concurrence in Senate version of H.R. 451).
476. Id.
477. Ch. 509, § 33, 44 Stat. 1440 (1927); ch. 685, §§ 12 & 13, 52 Stat. 1168.
478. 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1976).
479. 100 S. Ct. 925, 929 (1980) (emphasis added).
480. Id. (emphasis added).
481. Id. at 929 n.5, (citing Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act (Third Party Liability): Hearings Before a Special Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956)).
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legislature three years earlier can in any way provide support
as to the intention of the other body of Congress three years
later. Also, the House special subcommittee, after holding
three days of hearings in 1956, took no action toward enacting
legislation in any way affecting the LHWCA, but instead
raised a jurisdictional question as to whether the matter of
amending that statute might not more properly be taken up
by the House Merchant Marine Committee. 8 2
The subcommittee appreciates the concern of the various
parties participating in these hearings over the inequity of
permitting employees entitled to benefits under this act to
recover substantial sums from third parties when such parties are without fault. The subcommittee, in recognition of
this concern, is recommending to the appropriate committees of Congress that 483legislation be considered which will
remedy this situation.
Neither in that Congress nor any subsequent Congress until
1972 4" was action taken which addressed the primary concern
of the 1956 House special subcommittee.
Lastly, the Court asserted that "Congress elected not to
disturb the existing rule" 48 5 allowing a stevedore-employer to
assert a judicially created equitable lien against a third-party
recovery made by an injured longshoreman. Yet, the mere fact
that Congress "elected not to disturb" an existing judicial rule
does not in and of itself codify or uphold that judicial rule.
The Court made reference to a brief exchange which occurred
between two senators 48 6 prior to approval of the 1959 amendment to section 933 on a voice vote. 48 7 One senator 488 asked
whether the pending amendment to section 933 in any way
affected the Court's grant of an equitable lien to a stevedoreemployer on an employee's third-party recovery. 48 9 Another

482. LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION Acr (THIRD PARTY

LmiLrrY) REP. BY SPECIAL SUBCOMM. OF THE HousE COMM. ON EDuc. AND LABOR, 84th

Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1956) (Comm. Print, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., Y4.Ed. 8/1:L86/4).
483.
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.

Id.
See note 1 supra.
100 S. Ct. 925, 929 (1980).
Senators Butler and Bartlett.
See 105 CONG. REc. 12674-75 (1959).
Sen. Butler.
105 CONG. REc. 12674 (1959).
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senator, 9 0 quoting a statement from the committee which re-

ported the bill, stated that the committee found it unnecessary to include a provision in section 933 granting an employer a lien on an employee's third-party recovery for
compensation benefits since the courts had already construed
' 49 1
"the present section . . [933] as providing such lien.
However, the fact that, at the time Congress amended section
933 in 1959, federal courts had provided a stevedore-employer
with a judicially created lien under The Etna,492 does not pre-

clude subsequent courts from modifying the judicially created
rule of the case.
The statement by the Court that witnesses at the 1972
hearings on amendments to the LHWCA "brought to the attention of Congress the longstanding rule that an employer
could recover the full amount of its compensation award from
the longshoreman's recovery against the shipowner" 493 is not
supported by the portions of the hearing records cited by the
Court.4 " Therefore, no congressional intent on the question of
490. Sen. Bartlett.
491. 105 CONG. REc. 12674 (1959).
492. 138 F.2d 37 (3d Cir. 1943).
493. 100 S. Ct. 925, 931 (1980) (footnote omitted).
494. Justice Marshall in his opinion for the Court stated, "Witnesses also brought
to the attention of Congress the longstanding rule that an employer could recover the
full amount of its compensation award from the longshoreman's recovery against the
shipowner." 100 S. Ct. at 931 (footnotes omitted). In a footnote, the Court cited the
House and Senate hearing reports for support. Id. at n.10. A reading of the portions
of those records cited, however, does not lend persuasive authority to the Court's
assertion that the Etna lien rule was "brought to the attention of Congress."
The first reference the Court makes to the Senate hearing is to the prepared remarks of Thomas W. Gleason, president of the International Longshoremen's Ass'n,
AFL-CIO, which were inserted into the hearing record. Mr. Gleason did not appear
before the Senate subcommittee and did not testify. Further, his prepared remarks
noted that the "Compensation Act specifically requires longshoremen to repay the
stevedoring company employers out of any third party recovery .... ." 1972 Senate
Hearings, supra note 101, at 160 (emphasis added). Mr. Gleason did not refer to the
Etna rule.
Similarly, in prepared remarks inserted into the record, David B. Kaplan, chairman of the Admiralty Section, American Trial Lawyers Ass'n, in distinguishing between a recovery based on unseaworthiness and one founded on negligence, stated
that in either situation the "compensation carrier (the stevedore-employer or its insurance company) had a lien on his recovery of compensation damages for reimbursement of the compensation paid and the medical [benefits] furnished." 1972 Senate
Hearings,supra note 101, at 371. In his oral testimony, not cited by the Court, before
the subcommittee which consisted that day of only Sen. Eagleton, he remarked, "And
another think [sic] I want to make sure you understand completely: Out of your re-
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the Etna lien rule can be distilled therefrom.
The ability of the lower courts to reevaluate the Etna lien
rule in light of the loss-allocation system of comparative negligence existing under the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA
remains unimpaired, either by the legislative history of any
Congress considering amendments to the Act, or by the Sucovery, you must pay back all the sum of money that you may have received in compensation. So there is no double recovery." 1972 Senate Hearings, supra note 101, at
354. Mr. Kaplan made his remarks in the context of suggesting the abolishment of
workers' compensation as the exclusive liability of the employer.
Next, the Court refers to a letter from Braxton B. Carr, president of the American
Waterways Operators, Inc., to Sen. Williams, the Chairman of the Senate Labor and
Public Welfare Committee, stating, "Also, any compensation paid to the employer
under the Act is deducted from the court-awarded damages as an offset payment."
1972 Senate Hearings, supra note 101, at 720.
The first reference to the House hearings is to a colloquy between Rep. Daniels,
the Chairman of the House subcommittee, and Francis A. Scanlan, of the National
Maritime Compensation Committee. Four members of the House subcommittee were
present on that day when Rep. Daniels asked Mr. Scanlan what situation prevailed
under the LHWCA in regard to the right of a compensation carrier to recover the
amounts paid to an injured longshoreman. Mr. Scanlan replied:
The same situation prevails. There is a subrogation lien. If the longshoreman
recovers $30,000 or $100,000 and if his compensation lien amounts to $3,000 or
$4,000, that has to be deducted from either the settlement, the direct settlement, or from a verdict in court. So the same situation prevails, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Daniels. I just wanted to clarify that in my mind.
1972 House Hearings,supra note 101, at 119.
The Court next refers to the testimony given by John R. Martzall, president of the
Louisiana Trial Lawyers Ass'n, wherein he stated, "Under the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers [sic] Act the stevedore is permitted to intervene in the third-party
action to get back from the actual tort-feasor, the shipowner, all of the compensation
which it had already paid or is going to pay." 1972 House Hearings, supra note 101,
at 157. It is unclear whether Mr. Martzall meant to assert that the LHWCA itself
provided that in every circumstance the compensation carrier be allowed recovery of
benefits paid, or whether he meant to include both statutory and Etna lien recovery
situations.
The final reference made by the Court is to the companion prepared statement of
Mr. Gleason, supra, given before the House subcommittee. Again, Mr. Gleason did
not testify in person and in his prepared remarks, which were inserted into the hearing record, he makes reference only to the Act itself and not to any recovery rights
under case law. 1972 House Hearings,supra note 101, at 295.
Such evidence-letters, prepared remarks not delivered but merely inserted into
the hearing record, and oral testimony referring solely to the LHWCA itself and not
to any judicially created lien right rules--does not make for convincing authority
that, in fact, "[w]itnesses also brought to the attention of Congress the longstanding
rule" of the Etna case. Legislative ratification cannot be based on such evidence. Isolated statements, themselves often ambiguous and not on point, are simply not sufficient to invoke the general congressional awareness necessary to presume a legislative
ratification of a court ruling. See SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 121 (1978).
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preme Court's holding in Bloomer. Bloomer should properly
receive a narrow construction of its holding that a stevedoreemployer or its compensation carrier may not be held liable
for a proportionate share of a longshoreman's expenses in obtaining recovery from a negligent third party.
The eminent fairness and reasonableness of such an equitable lien credit rule within the context of a comparative negligence system is forcefully illustrated by applying the rule to
the facts and figures of the Edmonds case, The jury in that
case apportioned ten percent negligence to the injured employee, twenty percent to the shipowner, and seventy percent
to the stevedore-employer. 9 5 The jury awarded damages totalling $100,000, which were first reduced by the ten percent
causal negligence attributed to the employee. Under the Supreme Court's decision in Edmonds, the twenty percent negligent shipowner was severally liable for the entire $90,000
judgment. From this fund, the stevedore-employer's subrogated insurance company was allowed to enforce an Etna equitable lien in the amount of $49,152,96 the amount of statutory benefits paid. The end result was that the stevedoreemployer had no liability either in compensation benefits or
damage amounts, the shipowner was liable for $90,000, and
the injured employee received $49,152 in compensation benefits and $40,848 in damage amounts.
Applying the equitable lien credit rule to modify the Etna
lien rule, the result would be different and more fair. Assuming the same proportion of negligence among the parties, and
the same total damage award, the injured employee would receive the same amount of compensation benefits and the same
reduced damage award. The shift would occur between the
financial liability of the employer and the shipowner. Since
seventy percent or $70,000 of the total damage award was attributable to the negligence of the employer, the employer
would be denied an Etna lien because his payments to the
employee would be short of his percentage share of responsibility for the employee's total recovery. That is, the employer
is responsible for $70,000 in damages, but has paid only
$49,152. He cannot be compelled to pay the full $70,000 due

495. 99 S. Ct. 2753, 2755 (1979).
496. Id. at 2764 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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to the LHWCA benefit level limit. But because of his causal
negligence, the employer would not be allowed to recoup its
compensation benefits from the $90,000 damage amount
awarded to the employee. The negligent shipowner, on the
other hand, would not be liable, initially, for the entire
$90,000 damage amount. Instead, the shipowner would be liable for $20,000, the amount corresponding to its percentage of
comparative responsibility for the employee's injury. Additionally, due to its status as joint and several tortfeasor, it
would be required to pay the difference between the amount
of benefits paid by the employer and the employer's total percentage share of responsibility for the damage recovery. The
difference in outcome between application of a full Etna lien
and application of such a lien as modified by the equitable
lien credit rule can be illustrated by the table below.
%Fault

Recovery or Liability (Total $100,000)
Edmonds

Equitable Lien
Credit-Etna

Shipowner

20

(90,000)

(40,848)

StevedoreEmployer

70

0

(49,152)

Longshoreman

10

90,000*

90,000*

*[49,152 Workers' Compensation +
40,848 Third-Party Action]

Whether a stevedore-employer's compensation liability to an
injured employee following a third-party recovery should take
the form of future benefits paid according to the LHWCA
schedule, or a present value, lump-sum settlement, is a matter
for negotiation between the parties subject to the approval of
the Secretary of Labor on a case by case basis. 9
Modification of the Etna lien rule fully comports with the
five propositions asserted above4 9 8 as appropriate for any loss-

allocation scheme encompassing both a fault and a non-fault
mechanism. An injured employee receives his compensation
497. See 33 U.S.C. § 908(i)(A) & (B) (1976). See also 33 U.S.C. § 933(g) (1976)
(approval of stevedore-employer required for settlement between injured employee
and third party).
498. See text at page 416 supra.
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benefits regardless of fault. His tort recovery is diminished by
only his own causal negligence, and not by that of anyone else
(as it was in the circuit court's decision in Edmonds). The employee is still not allowed a double recovery of compensation
benefits and a damage award for the same injury. Most importantly, causal fault is apportioned as far as possible in relation
to the comparative responsibility of all wrongdoers. Finally, a
negligent employer is not required to pay any more than the
amount imposed by the benefits schedule of the LHWCA.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The general maritime law is one of the oldest bodies of law
known to man. For that reason it is often thought to be subject to a certain degree of inertia. It is true that there are less
drastic changes in that body of law than in many fields of law
in effect today. Nevertheless, the general maritime law has always been contemporary, progressive and often in a position
of leadership with regard to other areas of law.
The history of the general maritime law of tort indicates
that comparative negligence, in the form of divided damages
as to ship collisions and in the form of true comparative negligence as to personal injuries, has been in full force and effect
for many years. Recently, the divided damages rule as to collision law was altered to that of true comparative negligence.
The adoption of a rule of true comparative negligence in determining the legal and damage liabilities of the parties to an
accident involving a longshoreman is a logical, reasonable and
equitable extension of the applicability of true comparative
negligence in the general maritime law. There are no real barriers to such an extension, only the imagined impediment of
the "exclusive liability" provision of the LHWCA. As has been
pointed out above, there is no rhyme or reason for requiring
one party to bear the full brunt of liability and damages when
a number of parties are at fault in causally connected
negligence.
The time has come to stop the pendulum. For years it has
been swung between total liability on the part of a shipowner
or some other non-employing third party and total liability on
the part of a stevedore-employer for the injury or death of a
longshoreman or harbor worker caused by the concurrent negligence and fault of a number of parties including the steve-
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dore-employer. The authors are of the opinion that the fault
system of negligence under the general maritime law and the
non-fault system of liability under the LHWCA logically and
equitiably can be combined by use of the equitable lien credit
rule, so as to reach a result which does not cast an undue burden on any particular party and which permits the injured
longshoreman or harbor worker or the survivors of one who is
deceased to recover the full amount of damages due and owing by reason of the accident. The approval and adoption of
an equitable lien credit rule is in keeping with the modem
realistic philosophy of spreading the risk of liability and payment of damages over those causing or contributing to the
cause of a disaster within the logical, reasonable and equitable
boundaries of a hybridization of the two systems applicable
thereto. 9

499. A similar principle was used and the same result was reached under a modification of the theory of contribution in Minnesota and Pennsylvania. See Lambertson
v. Cincinnati Corp., 312 Minn. 114, 257 N.W.2d 679 (1977); Brown v. Dickey, 397 Pa.
454, 155 A.2d 836 (1959); Maio v. Fahs, 399 Pa. 180, 14 A.2d 105 (1940).

